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G M Breweries Share Price Today and Targets for 2026 to 2030

Published 19 min read Long Term · Screener · Micro Cap

G M Breweries Share Price Today and Targets for 2026 to 2030
G M Breweries Ltd GMBREW
Member Valuation Range ₹ ··· – ₹ ··· 🔒 Unlock the valuation view
Live Market Price
Market Cap
₹2,094 Cr
Book Value
₹471.95
Stock P/E
12.43
Dividend Yield
0.97%
ROE
ROCE
17.96%
PEG Ratio
EV/EBITDA

Fundamentals from Screener.in, as of 10 Sep 2026. Live price via Yahoo Finance.

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GMBREW chart on TradingView

Technical snapshot

EOD ·

G M Breweries Ltd closed at ₹905.70 on 15 September 2026, down 0.6% on the day, 0.1% above its 50-day average, 31.8% below its 52-week high, with volume at 0.75× its 20-session average.

RSI 14
50.5
vs 50-day SMA
+0.1%
vs 200-day SMA
-6.6%
From 52-week high
-31.8%
Relative volume
0.75×
20-day return
+2.9%

End-of-day prices from exchange-published files (NSE/BSE bhavcopy), updated after market close. Descriptive statistics, not investment advice.

G M Breweries share price today

G M Breweries

Anyone searching for the g m breweries share price is looking at one of the smaller and stranger listed consumer businesses in India: a Mumbai company that makes country liquor and Indian made foreign liquor, employs 227 people, and runs roughly ₹1,900 crore of revenue through them. It is not a story stock. It is a manufacturing and excise business whose economics are decided by state policy, input costs and volume, and whose shares trade at a fraction of the multiple that consumer brands in India usually command.

At the 10 September 2026 close, Yahoo Finance showed a price of about ₹917.65, market capitalisation near ₹2,094 crore and trailing EPS of ₹73.85. That is about 12.43 times trailing earnings and 1.94 times a book value of ₹471.95 a share. The dividend yield was 0.97% and return on capital employed, on Screener-derived figures captured on 5 August 2026, was 17.96%. The live quote above moves after publication; every ratio and every scenario input below is fixed to the stated cut-off.

One thing has to be said plainly before the tables start. The multi-year financial statements that Screener.in publishes were not captured for this company, so the annual figures used here come from Yahoo Finance’s own annual rows, and those rows stop well short of the trailing year. No quarterly profit series was captured at all. That is why there is no quarterly-results section below, and why the growth discussion leans on five-year CAGRs rather than on a line-by-line reconstruction of recent quarters.

What G M Breweries actually sells

The company was incorporated in 1981 and is based in Mumbai. It manufactures and sells alcoholic beverages in India, in two categories: Indian made foreign liquor and country liquor. Its named brands are G.M. SANTRA, G.M. DOCTOR, G.M. LIMBU PUNCH and G.M. DILBAHAR SOUNF.

ElementWhat the captured record saysWhy it matters to the numbers
CategoryCountry liquor and Indian made foreign liquorVolume-led, price-controlled, taxed at the state level
BrandsG.M. SANTRA, G.M. DOCTOR, G.M. LIMBU PUNCH, G.M. DILBAHAR SOUNFA narrow, regional portfolio rather than a national one
BaseMumbai, incorporated 1981A long operating history, not a recent listing
Employees227Roughly ₹8.4 crore of revenue per employee
Sector classificationConsumer Defensive; Beverages – Wineries & DistilleriesDemand is steady; pricing power is not automatic

The revenue-per-employee figure is the tell. A headcount of 227 against ₹1,900 crore of revenue is not a sign of extraordinary productivity so much as a sign that a very large share of the top line is not really the company’s to keep. In a business where state excise and duty structures sit inside or alongside the reported revenue line, headline sales and economic sales can be very different numbers. That gap is the single most important thing to understand before attaching any meaning to the margin percentages in the next section.

What the G M Breweries share price has done over 52 weeks

The stock has given back a substantial part of a prior move. Against a 52-week high of ₹1,264.20, the 10 September close of ₹917.65 sits 27.41% lower. Against the 52-week low of ₹692.70, it sits about 32% higher. Figures captured on 5 August 2026 showed the same high of ₹1,264.20, a slightly lower 52-week trough of ₹672.85 and a drawdown from the high of 28.1%, so the shape of the year has not changed materially in the five weeks between the two readings.

Price referenceLevelRelationship to the 10 September close
52-week high₹1,264.20The close sits 27.41% below this level
10 September 2026 close₹917.65The fixed input for every ratio below
52-week low₹692.70The close sits about 32% above this level

A drawdown of that size in a defensive consumer name usually means one of two things: either the market has repriced the durability of earnings, or the prior high embedded expectations the business did not meet. The captured data cannot distinguish between those, and pretending otherwise would be guesswork.

The revenue record, and where it breaks

Yahoo’s annual rows for this company are labelled by the calendar year in which the March financial year ended. They are the only multi-year statement figures captured, and they are incomplete: only one profit value survives, and the series ends at FY20.

Financial yearRevenueNet profit
FY17₹375 Cr₹44 Cr
FY18₹426 CrNot captured
FY19₹1,705 CrNot captured
FY20₹1,681 CrNot captured
Trailing twelve months to 10 September 2026₹1,900 CrNot stated as an annual figure

The FY18-to-FY19 step is a fourfold jump in one year. A distillery with this footprint does not quadruple organically in twelve months, so the most probable explanation is a change in how the revenue line is presented rather than a change in the business. The captured data does not carry the note that would settle it. The honest reading is that this series is not continuous across FY18 and FY19, and that anyone building a long-run growth picture should pull the company’s own filings rather than trust the level change.

What can be said with more confidence comes from the longer-horizon figures captured on 5 August 2026: a five-year sales CAGR of 17.07% and a five-year profit CAGR of 11.08%. Sales have compounded faster than profit over that window, which is the arithmetic signature of margin compression, not margin expansion. Set that against the trailing-year growth rates in the next section and the tension in this stock becomes visible.

Margins, cash and the excise question

The trailing-twelve-month figures captured from Yahoo are the most current operating data available for this company, and they are unusually strong on growth.

Trailing measureValueReading
Revenue₹1,900 CrThe top line, on whatever basis the company reports it
EBITDA₹196 CrAbout 10.3% of revenue
Reported operating margin5.6%Lower than the profit margin below, which is unusual
Profit margin8.88%Implies about ₹169 Cr of trailing net profit
Revenue growth, year on year25.8%Well above the five-year sales CAGR of 17.07%
Earnings growth, year on year45.9%Far above the five-year profit CAGR of 11.08%

Two observations follow, and both should be held loosely.

First, the margin lines do not sit in the order you would expect. A reported operating margin of 5.6% below a profit margin of 8.88% cannot describe a simple ladder from sales to operating profit to net profit on the same revenue base. Either the two percentages are computed on different denominators, or items below the operating line are adding materially to profit. EBITDA at 10.3% of revenue sits between them. Which definition applies to which line is not something the captured data settles, so treat the 5.6% figure as a data point to verify in the filings, not as the company’s operating margin.

Second, trailing growth of 25.8% on sales and 45.9% on earnings is running far ahead of the five-year record. Profit growing nearly twice as fast as sales means margins expanded sharply in the trailing year, and margin expansion of that order in a duty-heavy business is usually driven by something specific — a price revision, an input-cost move, a change in duty structure or a favourable mix shift. Whatever it is, it is not something the five-year record suggests repeats every year. A valuation model that extrapolates 45.9% earnings growth forward would be extrapolating the exception, not the rule. That is the central reason the scenario growth rates further down are set well below the trailing number.

Balance sheet: almost no debt, a tightly held register

The balance-sheet picture is the least ambiguous part of the file.

Balance-sheet signalValueWhy it matters
Total debt₹35 CrImmaterial against a ₹2,094 Cr market capitalisation
Total cash₹11 CrSmall, but the debt it offsets is small too
Debt to equity3.20%Effectively an unlevered balance sheet
Book value per share₹471.95Roughly ₹1,078 Cr of equity across the share count
Shares outstanding2,28,46,923A very small float by Indian market standards
Promoter holding77.38%Leaves a free float of 22.62%

An unlevered balance sheet in a cyclical, policy-exposed business is a genuine strength: there is no refinancing calendar to negotiate if a state changes its excise policy or a season goes badly. If leverage is a metric you weigh, the mechanics are worth reading in full in the guide to the debt-to-equity ratio, because 3.2% is close enough to zero that the ratio stops carrying information and the question moves to working capital instead.

Promoter holding of 77.38% cuts both ways. It aligns the controlling shareholder with minority investors and it makes the company hard to disrupt. It also means the free float is a small fraction of an already micro-cap company, which concentrates liquidity risk, widens spreads and reduces the number of institutional eyes on the disclosure. Neither institutional nor retail shareholding percentages were captured for this name, so the composition of the remaining 22.62% is not something this article can describe.

Return on capital and the dividend

Return on capital employed was 17.96% on the figures captured on 5 August 2026. Return on equity was not captured. For a business carrying almost no debt, those two numbers converge, so the absence of an ROE figure is less damaging here than it would be for a leveraged company — but it is still an absence, and it is worth reading what the two ratios actually measure before treating them as interchangeable, which the guide to return on equity sets out.

An ROCE near 18% is respectable without being exceptional. It says the capital in the business earns a real return above any plausible cost of debt. It does not say the business can redeploy incremental capital at that rate, which is the question that actually determines whether growth creates value.

On dividends, the yield was 0.97% at ₹917.65, which implies roughly ₹8.9 a share paid over the trailing year — about 12% of trailing EPS of ₹73.85. That is a modest payout. It is real cash, but it is not an income proposition, and the low payout means the case rests on what the retained 88% earns.

Valuation at the 10 September 2026 close

Valuation measure10 September 2026 readingInterpretation
Close₹917.65Fixed research input, not a live figure
Market capitalisation₹2,094 CrMicro-cap band; liquidity and disclosure gaps both matter
Trailing EPS₹73.85Yahoo Finance trailing basis
P/E, recalculated12.43×Price divided by trailing EPS
P/E, as reported12.41×Rounding difference only
Price to book1.94×Against book value of ₹471.95
ROCE17.96%Captured 5 August 2026
Dividend yield0.97%About 12% of trailing earnings

Twelve times earnings and under two times book is not a consumer-brand valuation. It is closer to how the market prices a regional manufacturer with policy exposure and limited pricing power. Whether that is the correct frame is the whole argument. If the business is a branded consumer franchise with durable volume, the multiple is low. If it is a duty-pass-through manufacturer whose trailing margin expansion was a one-year event, the multiple is roughly where it belongs. The captured record does not resolve that, and the way a multiple like this should be interrogated rather than accepted is covered in the P/E ratio guide.

Valuation framework

The scenario model starts with TTM EPS of ₹73.85. For each year it applies EPS_TTM × (1 + growth)^(year − 2026 + 112/365) × exit P/E, then rounds the result to the nearest ₹5. The 112/365 factor represents the fraction of the first forecast year remaining from 10 September to 31 December. Dividends are excluded.

ScenarioAnnual EPS growthExit P/EBusiness interpretation
Bear5%Trailing margin gain reverses, volume growth slows and the market re-rates a policy-exposed manufacturer downward
Base9%12×Growth settles near the five-year profit CAGR and the multiple stays roughly where it is today
Bull13%15×Volume and mix hold, part of the trailing margin gain proves structural and the market allows a modest re-rating

Three choices in that table are deliberate. The growth rates all sit below the five-year sales CAGR of 17.07%, and all sit far below the trailing earnings growth of 45.9%, because a one-year margin expansion is the weakest possible base for a five-year forecast. The base-case multiple is set at the current rating rather than above it, since assuming both sustained growth and permanent multiple expansion would simply restate today’s price with extra steps. And the bear multiple of 9× is not a crash assumption; it is what a de-rated, low-growth regional manufacturer can trade at without anything going catastrophically wrong. The general method behind all of this is set out in how to value a stock.

These are scenarios, not probability-weighted forecasts, and not a recommendation.

G M Breweries share price target 2026 to 2030

The grid above is generated only from the disclosed EPS, growth and exit-P/E inputs. It does not model a change in state excise policy, a duty revision, a capacity addition, an acquisition, a share issue, a buyback, a change in the accounting presentation of the revenue line, or the dividend stream. It also does not model the liquidity constraint that a 22.62% free float imposes on a ₹2,094 crore company — in a name this tightly held, the price a scenario implies and the price at which meaningful volume can actually transact are not the same thing. Every input should be refreshed after the next reported result before the framework is used again.

Risks that can break the thesis

The first and largest risk is policy. This is a business whose products are taxed, priced and in some cases distributed under state government control. A change in excise rates, licensing, permitted outlets or retail policy in the company’s operating states can move earnings in a single quarter in a way no operational execution can offset. That risk does not show up in a balance sheet and cannot be hedged by a low debt-to-equity ratio.

The second is the durability of the trailing margin. Earnings grew 45.9% year on year against a five-year profit CAGR of 11.08%. If the gap closes downward rather than the CAGR rising to meet it, trailing EPS of ₹73.85 is a peak input, and every scenario built on it is anchored too high. This is the specific reason the bear case pairs slow growth with a lower multiple: the two would likely arrive together.

The third is disclosure and liquidity. The multi-year statement tables were not captured, the quarterly profit series was not captured, return on equity was not captured, and the institutional shareholding split was not captured. That is a thinner evidence base than a larger company would offer, and it means more of the analytical weight falls on a small number of trailing figures. Combined with a 22.62% free float, an investor here is working with less information and less ability to change their mind quickly than in a large-cap name.

The fourth is input and mix exposure. A duty-heavy manufacturer with a reported operating margin in single digits has very little cushion between a cost move and the profit line. A grain, packaging or energy cost cycle that a higher-margin consumer company would absorb can be material here.

What would change the picture

The running checks belong in the scorecard below. What sits outside it are two single disclosures that would not merely improve the picture but redraw it, and they would do so in directions this article cannot predict. The first is a consistent-basis revenue line across FY18 and FY19. If the company’s own filings show the jump from ₹426 crore to ₹1,705 crore is a presentation change — excise duty moving inside the reported top line rather than sitting alongside it — then the ₹1,900 crore of trailing revenue used throughout this article is a duty-inflated number, every percentage struck against it is smaller than the same percentage on net sales would be, and the ₹8.4 crore of revenue per employee stops being a statement about productivity at all. If instead the step reflects real volume or a genuine change in what the company sells, the long-run record is better than this article has been able to credit it for, and 12.43 times earnings becomes harder to defend as a fair price. The two resolutions argue opposite cases from the same file, and only the filings settle which one applies.

The second is the ordering of the margin lines, which has to resolve before the 5.6% operating margin can be used for anything. Either the percentages are struck on different revenue bases — most plausibly one gross of excise and one net of it — in which case the true operating margin on net sales is a good deal higher than 5.6% and the thin cost cushion described in the risks above is wider than it looks; or items below the operating line are contributing materially to profit, in which case part of the trailing earnings is not operating income and the 45.9% growth figure is worth even less as a forward input than this article has already allowed. Separately, and whatever those two disclosures say, the payout ratio deserves watching against return on capital rather than on its own. The current 12% payout is only a strength while the retained 88% earns near 18%; a rising dividend without a matching improvement in ROCE would be the company telling shareholders it has run out of places to put the money, which is a better outcome for the cheque than for the compounding case that the low payout currently rests on.

Monitoring scorecard

QuestionConstructive evidenceWarning sign
Is the margin gain structural?Operating margin holds for several consecutive quartersMargin reverts toward the five-year average
Is profit keeping pace with sales?Profit CAGR converges upward toward the 17.07% sales CAGRThe gap between the two CAGRs widens further
Is capital still earning?ROCE stays at or above 18% as the asset base growsROCE falls while revenue rises
Is the balance sheet still clean?Debt to equity stays near the current 3.2%Borrowings rise to fund working capital or capacity
Is policy exposure stable?No adverse excise or licensing change in operating statesDuty revision, outlet restriction or pricing intervention
Is disclosure improving?Consistent multi-year statements and a clear revenue basisContinued discontinuities and unexplained presentation changes

What to weigh at the current price

G M Breweries is a long-established, unlevered, cash-paying manufacturer in a defensive category, trading at 12.43 times trailing earnings and 1.94 times book, 27.41% below its 52-week high, with a return on capital employed near 18%. That combination is genuinely uncommon, and it is the reason the stock is worth examining rather than dismissing.

The counterweight is that almost everything attractive about the trailing numbers is recent. Sales grew faster than profit over five years and slower than profit over the last one, which means the current earnings base rests on a margin outcome the longer record does not support. Layer on state-policy exposure that no balance sheet can offset, a 22.62% free float, and a captured financial record with material gaps in it, and the low multiple starts to look less like a mispricing and more like a price for uncertainty. What would settle the argument is not another good trailing year but several consecutive quarters showing the same margin, disclosed on a consistent basis.

FAQ

What is the share price target for G M Breweries in 2026?

The 2026 row of the scenario grid applies only a partial year of growth, the 112 days from 10 September to 31 December, to trailing EPS of ₹73.85, and then multiplies by each scenario’s exit P/E. Because the partial-year factor is small, the 2026 figures are driven far more by the assumed multiple than by the assumed growth rate. They are illustrations of three valuation outcomes, not a forecast of where the stock will close.

What is the share price target for G M Breweries in 2030?

The 2030 row compounds trailing EPS of ₹73.85 forward at 5%, 9% or 13% a year and applies exit multiples of 9×, 12× and 15×. Small differences in the growth rate compound into large differences by the fifth year, which is why the spread between scenarios widens with time. Treat it as a range of outcomes under stated assumptions, not a promised price.

What does G M Breweries do and which products does it make?

The company manufactures and sells alcoholic beverages in India, specifically Indian made foreign liquor and country liquor. Its named brands are G.M. SANTRA, G.M. DOCTOR, G.M. LIMBU PUNCH and G.M. DILBAHAR SOUNF. It was incorporated in 1981, is based in Mumbai, and employed 227 people at the time of the captured data.

Is G M Breweries listed on the NSE and the BSE?

The figures used in this article come from the NSE line, where the symbol is GMBREW. Many Indian companies of this vintage are listed on both exchanges, but the captured record covers only the NSE quote, so confirm the current listing status directly on the exchange sites rather than assuming it. The NSE quote and filings page is linked in the sources section below.

When does G M Breweries announce its quarterly results?

Listed Indian companies file quarterly results within the timeline SEBI’s listing regulations set, and each company announces its specific board-meeting date to the exchanges in advance. No quarterly result dates were captured for this company, so the exchange filings page is the correct place to check. This article deliberately contains no quarterly figures for that reason.

Does G M Breweries pay a dividend?

Yes. The dividend yield was 0.97% at the 10 September 2026 close of ₹917.65, which implies roughly ₹8.9 a share over the trailing year, or about 12% of trailing EPS of ₹73.85. That is a low payout ratio, so the investment case rests on what the retained earnings go on to earn rather than on the income itself.

Sources and methodology

Price, 52-week range, market capitalisation, trailing EPS, book value, price to book, dividend yield, debt, cash, revenue, EBITDA, the margin percentages, the year-on-year growth rates, share count, promoter holding and the annual FY17-to-FY20 rows were captured from Yahoo Finance after the completed 10 September 2026 session. The return on capital employed of 17.96% and the five-year sales and profit CAGRs of 17.07% and 11.08% are Screener-derived figures captured on 5 August 2026, which is also why the 52-week low differs slightly between the two readings. The multi-year statement tables that Screener.in publishes were not captured for this company, and no quarterly profit series was captured, which is stated explicitly rather than papered over. The business description and brand names come from the company’s own reported profile.

Analytical judgment begins after those figures. The reading of the FY18-to-FY19 revenue jump as a presentation change, the interpretation of the margin lines sitting out of their expected order, the treatment of trailing 45.9% earnings growth as an exception rather than a run rate, the choice of growth rates and exit multiples in the scenario table, and every risk and monitoring point are interpretation, not reported data. The scenario engine uses the formula and partial-year convention disclosed above; the live quote at the top of the page does not recalculate it.


This article is research and education, not personalised investment advice or a recommendation to transact. Gale is not a SEBI-registered investment adviser. The scenarios are illustrations, not guarantees. Verify current exchange filings, liquidity, corporate actions and suitability, and consult a registered adviser before acting.

G M BreweriesShare Price TargetGMBREWAlcoholic BeveragesCountry LiquorNSE