Tinna Rubber Share Price: Target 2026 to 2030, Valuation and Risks
- Market Cap
- ₹1,842 Cr
- Book Value
- ₹168.66
- Stock P/E
- 29.09
- Dividend Yield
- 0.32%
- ROE
- 22.09%
- ROCE
- 22.31%
- PEG Ratio
- 0.14
- EV/EBITDA
- 19.73
Fundamentals from Screener.in, as of 10 Sep 2026. Live price via Yahoo Finance.
Technical snapshot
EOD ·Tinna Rubber Ltd closed at ₹1,018.75 on 18 September 2026, up 1.8% on the day, 3.3% below its 50-day average, 22.9% below its 52-week high, with volume at 0.43× its 20-session average.
- RSI 14
- 48.6
- vs 50-day SMA
- -3.3%
- vs 200-day SMA
- +22.8%
- From 52-week high
- -22.9%
- Relative volume
- 0.43×
- 20-day return
- -1.6%
End-of-day prices from exchange-published files (NSE/BSE bhavcopy), updated after market close. Descriptive statistics, not investment advice.
Tinna Rubber share price today
Anyone looking up the Tinna Rubber share price has arrived at one of the stranger corners of the Indian market. The raw material here is the tyre you threw away. Tinna Rubber and Infrastructure collects end-of-life tyres and breaks them back into their components, then sells those components into roads, sports surfaces, tyre compounding and steel cleaning. It is a circular-economy business wearing the financial clothes of a small industrial commodity processor, and that tension is the whole investment question.
At the 10 September 2026 research cut-off the completed-session price on Yahoo Finance was ₹1,024.20, market capitalisation about ₹1,842 crore and trailing EPS ₹35.21. That works out to roughly 29.1 times trailing earnings and 6.06 times a book value of ₹168.66 per share. The quote widget above updates after publication; every ratio in this article stays fixed to the stated cut-off so the arithmetic remains checkable.
The 52-week range frames the mood. The stock traded as high as ₹1,189.90 and as low as ₹536, so the cut-off price sits 13.93% below the high and roughly 91% above the low. A share that nearly doubled off its floor and then gave back a seventh of its peak is not a quiet compounder. It is a small company whose selling prices move with commodity markets, and the price chart reflects that.
What Tinna Rubber actually does
The company was founded in 1977, is based in New Delhi, and traded as Tinna Overseas Limited until it took its present name in December 2012. It employed 1,037 people at the cut-off and exports alongside its domestic sales. Yahoo Finance classifies it under Basic Materials and, more specifically, Specialty Chemicals, which understates how physical the process actually is.
| Output family | Representative products | Where it is consumed |
|---|---|---|
| Recycled rubber | Crumb rubber, micronised and coated rubber powders, high tensile reclaim rubber, crumb rubber modifier | Tyre compounding, rubber mats, conveyor belts, gym tiles, crumb rubber infills |
| Bitumen products | Crumb rubber modified bitumen, polymer modified bitumen, bitumen emulsion | Road construction and resurfacing |
| Steel materials | Steel abrasives, ceramic foam filters | Surface preparation and metal casting |
| Recycled polymers | ABS, polypropylene copolymer, high impact polystyrene, LDPE | Automotive parts and moulded plastics |
| Masterbatches and compounds | Black, white, filler, colour, additive, silicone and biodegradable masterbatches, heat shrinkable compounds | Plastics processing |
The logic linking these lines is that a scrap tyre is not one material. Strip it and you get rubber, steel wire and textile. Tinna monetises the rubber as crumb and reclaim, converts part of that crumb into a bitumen modifier for roads, and recovers the steel into abrasives. The polymer and masterbatch lines extend the same idea from tyres into other waste streams. A single feedstock supporting several end markets is a genuine structural advantage, because it reduces the chance that one weak market idles the plant.
The economics: a spread business, not a branded one
It is worth being blunt about what kind of business this is. Tinna buys a waste input whose price is set by scrap markets and sells outputs whose prices track natural and synthetic rubber, bitumen and steel. Profit is the spread between the two, multiplied by volume. There is no consumer brand insulating the middle.
That is why the reported margin matters more here than the growth rate. The figures captured on 10 September 2026 show an operating margin of 18.95% on Yahoo’s basis, and the Screener-derived figures captured on 5 August 2026 put the operating profit margin at 18.53%. Both readings sit in the high teens, which is respectable for a recycler and is the most important single number in the file, because it is the only direct measure of the spread the business actually earns. Two readings a month apart landing within half a point of each other is mildly reassuring on measurement, but it is not evidence of durability: two sources agreeing about substantially the same trailing period is one observation, not a trend.
What the trailing financials show
| Trailing measure | 10 September 2026 reading | Note |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue | ₹572 Cr | Yahoo trailing total revenue |
| EBITDA | ₹106 Cr | Yahoo trailing EBITDA |
| Operating margin | 18.95% | Yahoo basis |
| Profit margin | 10.79% | Yahoo basis |
| Implied trailing net profit | About ₹62 Cr | 10.79% applied to ₹572 Cr |
| Trailing EPS | ₹35.21 | Yahoo trailing EPS |
| Shares outstanding | 1,80,15,757 | About 1.8 crore shares |
| Employees | 1,037 | As reported by Yahoo |
One transparency point before going further. No multi-year financial-statement tables were captured for this company at the cut-off. The only annual figure available is a net profit of ₹48 crore for the financial year ended March 2025, with no matching revenue line, and no quarterly figures were captured at all. That is why this article contains no quarterly-results section and no five-year revenue table. The multi-year picture below therefore rests on compound growth rates and return ratios rather than on a reconstructed profit and loss account, and readers who want the full statements should open the company’s filings directly.
Growth history and the base-effect problem
The compound growth rates look extraordinary. The Screener-derived figures captured on 5 August 2026 show a five-year sales CAGR of 33.22% and a five-year profit CAGR of 238.19%. The more recent Yahoo readings show year-on-year revenue growth of 19.9% and year-on-year earnings growth of 67.1%.
| Growth measure | Reading | How to read it |
|---|---|---|
| Sales CAGR, five years | 33.22% | Real volume and capacity expansion |
| Profit CAGR, five years | 238.19% | Dominated by an extremely low starting base |
| Revenue growth, year on year | 19.9% | The more recent and more repeatable number |
| Earnings growth, year on year | 67.1% | Operating leverage on a small profit pool |
| PEG | 0.14 | Arithmetically true, analytically useless here |
A 238% profit CAGR is not a forecastable rate. It is what happens when a company earning very little starts earning something. The same arithmetic produces the PEG of 0.14, which divides a 29 times earnings multiple by a growth rate no business sustains for five more years. PEG is a shorthand that assumes the past growth rate is the future one, and here that assumption is plainly wrong. The P/E ratio guide explains why the denominator matters more than the ratio, and the valuation method used across this site deliberately sets growth by judgment rather than by extrapolating a base effect.
The honest anchor is the 19.9% revenue growth, because revenue cannot be flattered by a small base in the same way profit can.
Returns on capital
| Return measure | Reading | Source period |
|---|---|---|
| Return on equity | 22.09% | Screener-derived, 5 August 2026 |
| Return on capital employed | 22.31% | Screener-derived, 5 August 2026 |
| ROCE, five-year average | 25.88% | Screener-derived, 5 August 2026 |
| Operating profit margin | 18.53% | Screener-derived, 5 August 2026 |
| Dividend yield | 0.32% | 10 September 2026 |
These are the most encouraging numbers in the file. A ROCE of 22.31% against a five-year average of 25.88% says the plants have been earning well above any plausible cost of capital, and that the current year is slightly below the recent norm rather than above it. ROE of 22.09% on a book value of ₹168.66 per share is consistent with that. For a definition of what the ratio does and does not capture, see the return on equity guide.
The slight fade from the five-year ROCE average to the current figure is worth watching rather than worrying about. It can come from new capacity that has not yet filled, from a weaker realisation year, or from a larger asset base. Only the statements can separate those, and they were not captured here.
The dividend yield of 0.32% confirms this is a reinvestment case, not an income one.
Balance sheet and ownership
| Balance-sheet and holding measure | Reading |
|---|---|
| Total debt | ₹129 Cr |
| Total cash | ₹4 Cr |
| Debt to equity | 42.98% |
| Book value per share | ₹168.66 |
| Price to book | 6.06 |
| EV / EBITDA | 19.73 (Screener-derived, 5 August 2026) |
| Promoter holding | 69.50% |
| Promoter pledge | Nil |
Debt of ₹129 crore against cash of ₹4 crore and a debt-to-equity ratio near 43% is not alarming for an asset-heavy processor, but it is not a net-cash balance sheet either. A business whose margin depends on a commodity spread carries that leverage with less comfort than a software company would. The debt-to-equity guide sets out how to read the ratio against the volatility of the earnings that service it.
Ownership is concentrated and clean. Promoters hold 69.5% with no shares pledged. That alignment is a genuine positive; the offsetting consideration is that a 69.5% promoter block leaves a small floating stock, which is part of why the price can travel from ₹536 to ₹1,189.90 and back toward ₹1,024 inside a year. Institutional holding percentages were not captured for this name.
What changed between August and September
Two sets of figures a little over a month apart make a useful comparison, because they show how quickly the valuation of a micro-cap moves without any change in the underlying business.
| Measure | 5 August 2026 | 10 September 2026 |
|---|---|---|
| Market capitalisation | ₹2,012 Cr | ₹1,842 Cr |
| Price to earnings | 32.61 | 29.09 |
| Price to book | 6.72 | 6.06 |
| Trailing EPS | ₹34.40 | ₹35.21 |
| Book value per share | ₹166.80 | ₹168.66 |
| Dividend yield | 0.36% | 0.32% |
| Distance from 52-week high | 6.9% below | 13.93% below |
Earnings and book value both edged up while the market capitalisation fell by about ₹170 crore. The entire de-rating from 32.6 to 29.1 times came from the price, not from the fundamentals. That is normal behaviour in a thinly floated micro-cap, and it is the practical reason scenario work here uses a range of exit multiples rather than a single one.
Valuation at the research cut-off
| Valuation measure | Reading, 10 September 2026 unless dated | Interpretation |
|---|---|---|
| Completed-session price | ₹1,024.20 | Fixed research input, not a live figure |
| Market capitalisation | ₹1,842 Cr | Micro-cap; liquidity and execution risk matter |
| Trailing EPS | ₹35.21 | Yahoo trailing basis |
| Recalculated P/E | 29.09 | Price divided by trailing EPS |
| Reported P/E | 29.05 | Yahoo trailing P/E, effectively the same |
| Price to book | 6.06 | Against ₹168.66 book value per share |
| EV / EBITDA | 19.73 | Screener-derived on the 5 August market capitalisation; enterprise value includes debt |
| ROE / ROCE | 22.09% / 22.31% | Screener-derived, 5 August 2026; the strongest part of the case |
Twenty-nine times earnings and six times book is a growth-company rating applied to a materials-processing business. It is defensible while ROCE stays in the low twenties and volumes keep expanding. It offers very little cushion if a bad spread year drops the margin by a few hundred basis points, because on this base a margin move translates straight into the earnings line.
Valuation framework: growth must earn the multiple
The scenario model starts with TTM EPS of ₹35.21. For each year it applies EPS_TTM × (1 + growth)^(year − 2026 + 112/365) × exit P/E, then rounds the result to the nearest ₹5. The 112/365 factor represents the fraction of the first forecast year remaining from 10 September to 31 December.
| Scenario | Annual EPS growth | Exit P/E | Business interpretation |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bear | 8% | 16× | Realisations compress, road demand slows and the market reprices a commodity processor as one |
| Base | 15% | 26× | Volume growth roughly tracks recent revenue growth while margin holds in the high teens |
| Bull | 22% | 34× | Capacity expansion, export mix and steady bitumen offtake keep ROCE in the mid-twenties |
The bear multiple sits well below the present rating because a spread business with a small float can lose a valuation premium quickly. The base multiple sits a little under today’s 29.09 rather than above it, and even the bull case assumes only modest re-rating alongside good growth. None of these growth rates comes close to extrapolating the five-year profit CAGR, for the reason set out earlier. These are scenarios, not probability-weighted forecasts.
Tinna Rubber share price target 2026 to 2030
The grid above is generated purely from the disclosed trailing EPS, the three growth rates and the three exit multiples in the table. It does not model an equity issue, a change in share count, an acquisition, a commodity price shock, a change in the promoter block, government road-spending policy, or any working capital or interest effect from the ₹129 crore of debt. It also cannot include quarterly momentum, because no quarterly figures were captured. Treat it as an arithmetic consequence of three stated assumptions, and rebuild it when the next set of results is published.
Risks that can break the thesis
The first risk is the spread itself. Tinna buys scrap and sells commodity outputs, so a period in which tyre-scrap procurement costs rise while crumb rubber, bitumen or steel abrasive realisations do not will compress margin directly. On a profit pool this size, a few points of margin is a large proportion of earnings.
The second is customer concentration by end market rather than by name. Crumb rubber modified bitumen depends on road construction, which depends on public budgets and tender cycles. A slow year in road awards is not something the company can offset with pricing.
The third is the starting valuation. Six times book and twenty-nine times earnings on a micro-cap means the share price can fall meaningfully even if earnings merely stop growing. The move from ₹1,189.90 to ₹1,024.20 with rising EPS is a small demonstration of exactly that mechanism.
The fourth is disclosure depth. With no multi-year statements and no quarterly series captured here, the trailing figures cannot be checked against a trend. That is a reason to go to the filings before acting on any of it, not a reason to assume the worst.
Finally, feedstock supply is a regulatory question as much as a commercial one. End-of-life tyre collection depends on waste-handling rules and on how organised the scrap channel is. Changes in either direction affect both input cost and the barrier to entry.
What would change the thesis
The scorecard below tracks the numbers this article already has. What would actually move the case is mostly information it does not have.
The largest single change would be the arrival of several consecutive years of statements and a quarterly series. Neither was captured here, which means the 18.95% operating margin and the 22.31% return on capital employed are single points with no line drawn through them. Two or three years of statements would show whether that margin is a level or a peak. Quarterly numbers would show whether the 19.9% revenue growth arrives evenly or in the lumps that a tender-driven order book produces, and lumpy quarters at the same annual rate are a materially different business to underwrite.
Segment disclosure matters almost as much. The company sells crumb and reclaim rubber, bitumen modifiers, steel abrasives, recycled polymers and masterbatches, and nothing captured here splits revenue or profit between them. Without that split there is no way to tell whether the recycling franchise or the road-facing bitumen line is carrying the return on capital, and those two have different customers, different cycles and different reasons to persist. A segment table would turn the product list earlier in this article into an argument about where the economics actually sit.
The export share is the third item, and the one most likely to appear soonest. The company is described as exporting, but every source used here leaves the proportion qualitative. A disclosed export percentage, repeated across periods, is the cleanest available test of whether the business is genuinely diversifying away from Indian road budgets or simply growing alongside them.
Fourth is anything that changes the share count or the float. The scenario grid compounds a per-share number, so an equity issue to fund capacity would reset the arithmetic even if every operating assumption held. The same applies in the other direction: institutional holdings were not captured for this name at all, and the first meaningful institutional position in a stock with a 69.5% promoter block would change who is setting the price in the thin float described earlier.
Monitoring scorecard
| Question | Constructive evidence | Warning sign |
|---|---|---|
| Is the spread being managed? | Operating margin holds near 19% across price cycles | Margin falls while revenue grows |
| Is new capacity earning? | ROCE stays near the 25.88% five-year average | Asset base grows while ROCE fades |
| Is the revenue mix broadening? | Export and non-bitumen lines gain share | Growth depends on road tenders alone |
| Is leverage under control? | Debt stays near ₹129 Cr or falls | Borrowing rises faster than EBITDA |
| Is the promoter block stable? | 69.5% holding, nil pledge maintained | Any pledge, or a decline in holding |
| Is growth repeatable? | Revenue growth near or above 19.9% | Deceleration with the multiple unchanged |
What the current price assumes
At ₹1,024.20 the market is paying about 29 times trailing earnings and six times book for a company that has compounded sales at 33% over five years and earns a return on capital in the low twenties. That is not an obviously stretched price for those returns, and it is not a cheap one either. The rating implicitly assumes that the last five years of expansion were the beginning of a durable recycling franchise rather than the recovery of a small company from a low base.
A single set of ratios cannot settle that argument, and the rating offers no discount for the fact that it is unsettled. That is the actual decision facing a buyer at ₹1,024.20: whether to pay a durable-franchise multiple on one year of visible evidence, or to wait until the filings supply the years the multiple is already assuming. Those filings are the right place to check the picture assembled here, which is built from market data and ratio history rather than from a full financial history.
FAQ
What is Tinna Rubber’s share price target for 2026?
The 2026 row of the grid above applies each scenario’s growth rate to trailing EPS of ₹35.21 for the 112 days remaining in the calendar year, then multiplies by that scenario’s exit P/E. Because only about 31% of the year remains from the 10 September cut-off, the 2026 figures are driven far more by the assumed multiple than by the assumed growth rate. They are illustrations of arithmetic, not price predictions.
What is the Tinna Rubber share price target for 2030?
The 2030 row compounds trailing EPS forward by roughly 4.3 years at each scenario’s growth rate before applying the exit multiple. Small differences in assumed growth become large differences in outcome over that span, which is why three scenarios are shown rather than one number. Read it as a range of consequences from stated assumptions.
What does Tinna Rubber do?
It recycles end-of-life tyres and other waste streams into saleable materials. The main outputs are crumb rubber and reclaim rubber, crumb rubber modified bitumen and other bitumen products for roads, steel abrasives and ceramic foam filters, recycled polymers such as ABS and polypropylene copolymer, and masterbatches. Its products are used in roads, gym tiles, rubber mats, conveyor belts, automotive parts and tyre compounding.
Who are the promoters of Tinna Rubber?
Promoters held 69.5% of the company at the 10 September 2026 cut-off, with no shares pledged. That is a high and clean promoter holding, which aligns management with shareholders but also leaves a small public float. The current shareholding pattern is filed with the exchanges and should be checked there before relying on the figure.
Is Tinna Rubber listed on NSE or BSE, and what is its ticker?
The company is listed on the NSE under the symbol TINNARUBR, which is the identifier used for the quote and the data in this article. Its Yahoo Finance ticker is TINNARUBR.NS. The NSE quote page linked in the sources section carries the live price, board meeting notices and corporate filings.
What is the Tinna Rubber share price today?
The widget at the top of this page shows the current quote for TINNARUBR.NS. The fixed research price used throughout this article is the ₹1,024.20 close of 10 September 2026, against a 52-week range of ₹536 to ₹1,189.90. Every ratio here is calculated on that cut-off price and will drift as the live price moves.
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Sources and methodology
All market figures were captured after the completed 10 September 2026 session. The price, 52-week range, market capitalisation, trailing EPS, book value, trailing revenue and EBITDA, operating and profit margins, debt, cash, debt-to-equity, share count, employee count and the business description come from Yahoo Finance. The return ratios, operating profit margin, five-year sales and profit CAGRs, PEG, EV/EBITDA, promoter holding and pledge percentage come from Screener-derived figures, with the comparison column dated 5 August 2026 where stated. No multi-year statements and no quarterly figures were captured for this company, so none are reproduced or estimated here; the only annual figure available was net profit of ₹48 crore for the year ended March 2025.
Analytical judgment begins at the point where those figures stop. The reading of the business as a spread processor rather than a branded manufacturer, the decision to discount the five-year profit CAGR and the PEG that follows from it, the choice of growth rates and exit multiples in the scenario table, and the risks and monitoring questions are interpretation, not reported data.
This article is research and education, not personalised investment advice or a recommendation to transact. Gale is not a SEBI-registered investment adviser. The scenarios are illustrations, not guarantees. Verify current exchange filings, liquidity, corporate actions and suitability, and consult a registered adviser before acting.