Apollo Hospitals Share Price Target 2026, 2027, 2028, 2029, 2030
- Market Cap
- ₹1,28,112 Cr
- Book Value
- ₹660.00
- Stock P/E
- 68.5
- Dividend Yield
- 0.22%
- ROE
- 21.2%
- ROCE
- 17.4%
- PEG Ratio
- 2.13
- EV/EBITDA
- 34.5
Fundamentals from Screener.in, as of 6 Aug 2026. Live price via Yahoo Finance.
Technical snapshot
EOD ·Apollo Hospitals Enterprise Ltd closed at ₹8,836.00 on 14 September 2026, up 0.0% on the day, 0.0% below its 50-day average, 2.4% below its 52-week high, with volume at 0.75× its 20-session average.
- RSI 14
- 51.6
- vs 50-day SMA
- -0.0%
- vs 200-day SMA
- +11.2%
- From 52-week high
- -2.4%
- Relative volume
- 0.75×
- 20-day return
- +0.1%
End-of-day prices from exchange-published files (NSE/BSE bhavcopy), updated after market close. Descriptive statistics, not investment advice.
Apollo Hospitals share price today
At our 6 August 2026 research cut-off, Apollo Hospitals Enterprise Ltd (NSE: APOLLOHOSP) had a market capitalisation of ₹1,28,112 Cr. The share price was ₹8,945, against a 52-week range of ₹6,794 to ₹9,050. The live quote above updates independently, while every fundamental ratio below remains fixed at that date.
Apollo combines mature hospitals with pharmacies, diagnostics and digital health. The question is whether those adjacent businesses add cash returns without diluting hospital economics. The figures show 17.4% ROCE, 21.2% ROE and 76.0% five-year profit growth. Those are attractive headline numbers, but the stock market pays for what comes next.
What the business actually earns money from
Apollo operates hospitals alongside pharmacies, diagnostics and digital-health services. Mature hospitals can produce strong cash flows as occupancy and revenue per bed rise, while new hospitals suppress group returns during ramp-up. The wider platform adds customer touchpoints but should be valued only where unit economics are visible.
The durable advantage is a national hospital brand with mature-bed economics and multiple healthcare touchpoints. A moat should show up in numbers, not adjectives. Here the tests are return on capital, margin resilience, market-share behaviour and the amount of balance-sheet funding needed to grow. The 17.0% five-year average ROCE is more informative than a single strong year because it spans changes in demand and input costs.
Healthcare demand is resilient, but hospital economics are not automatic. A slower bed ramp, departure of important clinicians, payer pressure or an unfavourable case mix can weaken returns despite growing patient numbers. Apollo’s brand helps attract complex cases; the question is whether new investments can reproduce mature-hospital economics without overextending the balance sheet.
The investment debate
Healthcare demand is durable, yet hospital returns depend on occupancy, clinical mix, doctor economics and disciplined capex. Five-year profit growth of 76% was shaped by recovery and operating leverage, so it cannot be projected indefinitely. A high multiple therefore needs both continued hospital maturity and proof that adjacent businesses create value rather than complexity.
The historical growth split helps frame that debate. Sales compounded at 19.0% and profit at 76.0% over five years. Over three years those rates were 15.0% and 32.0%. Profit growth has slowed versus the five-year record. That is not automatically bullish or bearish: acceleration can reflect a sustainable mix shift or a low base, while deceleration can be temporary or the first evidence that the old multiple is no longer deserved.
The stock sat about 1.2% below its 52-week high and 31.7% above its low at that date. Distance from a high is not valuation. It is useful only when paired with earnings, balance-sheet and competitive evidence.
Mature beds and new beds have different economics
A hospital portfolio should not be analysed as one homogeneous capacity number. Mature hospitals usually have established doctor networks, referral flows and higher occupancy; their incremental patient can carry attractive contribution margin. New hospitals absorb staff, equipment and marketing costs before occupancy reaches a stable level. A company can therefore report healthy revenue growth while a large expansion programme temporarily depresses consolidated margins and ROCE.
For Apollo, the useful bridge is from operational beds to occupied beds, then to revenue per occupied bed and operating profit after clinical costs. The base scenario assumes gradual maturation rather than instant economics from every announced bed. The bull path requires new facilities to fill without weakening clinical quality or payer mix. The bear path reflects slower ramp-up, elevated employee costs or tariff pressure that delays the cash return on capex.
The healthcare platform is optionality, not free value
Pharmacy, diagnostics and digital-health services widen Apollo’s relationship with a patient beyond an admission. They can improve convenience, referrals and data continuity, but each business has a different margin, capital need and competitive set. Pharmacy scale may generate high revenue on thin margins; digital activity can grow users before producing cash; diagnostics can offer better economics but attracts specialised competitors. Adding the divisions’ revenues together is not a valuation method.
A sound sum-of-the-parts cross-check should assign value only after observing unit economics and cash conversion, then subtract central costs and net obligations. The hospital franchise remains the anchor. If adjacent businesses improve customer retention and reach break-even without repeated capital infusions, they can justify optionality. If they require sustained funding or rely on promotional acquisition, the market should not capitalise their gross sales like hospital earnings.
Clinical quality is an economic variable
Hospital investing involves more than bed count. Outcomes, infection control, doctor retention, regulatory compliance and patient trust determine occupancy and pricing power over time. Cost cutting that damages service quality can lift one quarter’s margin while weakening the franchise. Conversely, investment in clinicians and technology may pressure near-term profit but protect the brand and case mix.
The investor dashboard should therefore combine financial and operating evidence: occupancy, average revenue per occupied bed, length of stay, mature versus new-facility margin, capex per new bed and cash conversion. Apollo’s 21.2% ROE is encouraging, but the 0.90 debt-to-equity ratio and 2.49% promoter pledge make disciplined expansion important. A higher multiple is defensible only if growth preserves both clinical standards and balance-sheet flexibility.
Growth, margins and capital efficiency
| Operating evidence | 6 Aug 2026 | How to read it |
|---|---|---|
| Sales CAGR, 5 years | 19.0% | Demand, pricing and consolidation together |
| Profit CAGR, 5 years | 76.0% | Includes margin and financial leverage |
| Sales CAGR, 3 years | 15.0% | More recent top-line momentum |
| Profit CAGR, 3 years | 32.0% | More recent earnings momentum |
| Operating margin | 15.0% | Business-model economics before interest and tax |
| ROCE / five-year ROCE | 17.4% / 17.0% | Current return versus durability |
| ROE | 21.2% | Return delivered on shareholder equity |
Apollo’s 15% operating margin blends hospitals with lower-margin or earlier-stage healthcare activities. Segment margins and capital employed are therefore more useful than the consolidated percentage alone. Hospital expansion creates value when occupancy, revenue per bed and clinical mix lift returns after the ramp period. Revenue growth alongside declining mature-hospital margins would be a more serious warning than temporary start-up losses at a clearly identified new facility.
Five-year profit CAGR of 76% includes recovery from a depressed base and is not a sensible forecast. The still-strong 32% three-year rate shows operating leverage, but the scenarios step down sharply from both figures. The long-run result should be anchored in bed additions, occupancy and cash return—not in mechanically compounding a rebound statistic.
Balance sheet, ownership and cash-flow questions
Debt to equity of 0.90 requires context and monitoring; headline growth is less valuable when it demands disproportionate financing. Promoter holding is 28.02%, with promoter pledge of 2.49% at that date. Pledge is not proof of a problem, but movement in that number is a governance signal and belongs on the watchlist.
| Balance-sheet and ownership check | 6 Aug 2026 |
|---|---|
| Debt to equity | 0.90 |
| Promoter holding | 28.02% |
| Promoter pledge | 2.49% |
| Book value per share | ₹660.00 |
| Dividend yield | 0.22% |
Hospital profit must be reconciled with equipment replacement, new-bed capex, leases and working capital across pharmacies. Track operating cash flow by business where disclosure permits, then compare it with the cash committed to expansion. Rising EBITDA with persistently weak free cash after mature facilities have stabilised would be a reason to lower the valuation multiple.
Dividend yield of 0.22% is not the main reason to own the stock; most of the expected return must come from earnings growth and valuation discipline. The payout should be viewed after necessary reinvestment, not in isolation.
The numbers
| Metric | 6 Aug 2026 |
|---|---|
| Market capitalisation | ₹1,28,112 Cr |
| Share price | ₹8,945 |
| P/E · price/book | 68.5 · 13.50 |
| PEG · EV/EBITDA | 2.13 · 34.5 |
| ROE · ROCE | 21.2% · 17.4% |
| Operating margin | 15.0% |
| Debt/equity | 0.90 |
| EPS (TTM) | ₹130.07 |
| Book value per share | ₹660.00 |
| 52-week range | ₹6,794 – ₹9,050 |
Valuation: what today’s multiple already assumes
The P/E is 68.5 times, price/book 13.50 times, PEG 2.13, and EV/EBITDA 34.5 times. No one ratio settles the case. P/E connects price to shareholder earnings; EV/EBITDA helps compare operations before financing; price/book matters when the asset base is economically meaningful; PEG is only as reliable as the growth rate placed beneath it.
Quality alone is not a buying signal. At the recorded valuation, execution must justify a substantial premium; a wider margin of safety matters more than a confident story. The target framework compounds the recorded TTM EPS of ₹130.07 and applies different exit multiples. It does not assume that today’s multiple survives automatically. That distinction matters because a company can grow profit while its share price disappoints if the starting valuation was too optimistic.
| Scenario | EPS growth assumption | Exit P/E | What must be true |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bear | 12% | 40× | Competitive or cyclical pressure slows growth and the premium contracts |
| Base | 20% | 53× | The core franchise executes without assuming a perfect cycle |
| Bull | 27% | 67× | Growth stays strong and the market continues to pay for quality |
Apollo Hospitals share price target 2026 to 2030
The bear, base and bull paths use the assumptions above for every year through 2030. They are scenario arithmetic, not a forecast of where the share must trade. The model uses one consistent diluted EPS base and rounds only the displayed outcomes. Dividends are not added to the price targets, so total shareholder return would differ from the table.
Scenario warning: earnings, capital structure and market multiples can all move outside these assumptions. Read the range as a sensitivity map, never as a promise or personalised recommendation.
What would change our mind
The thesis should be reviewed against measurable evidence, not daily price movement:
- Hospital occupancy, average revenue per occupied bed and margin. A sustained adverse trend matters more than one noisy quarter.
- Mature versus new-bed return profile. A sustained adverse trend matters more than one noisy quarter.
- Pharmacy and digital-health contribution economics. A sustained adverse trend matters more than one noisy quarter.
- Promoter pledge, capex and net debt. A sustained adverse trend matters more than one noisy quarter.
We would also revisit the model if equity dilution, a large acquisition or a material accounting change altered EPS comparability. Targets are not “set and forget”; the framework must be rebuilt when the business base changes.
What to weigh at the current price
At 68.5 times earnings, Apollo needs more than durable healthcare demand. The case rests on mature hospitals sustaining occupancy and margins, new beds moving up the return curve and the pharmacy and digital businesses proving their value in cash terms. The national brand is a strength; the key question is whether the wider platform can compound without debt and capex absorbing too much of the benefit.
FAQ
What is the Apollo Hospitals share price target for 2030?
The table on this page presents bear, base and bull outcomes for 2026–2030. Each number comes from the stated EPS growth and exit P/E assumptions; there is no single assured target.
Is Apollo Hospitals overvalued?
At 68.5 times earnings and 34.5 times EV/EBITDA, the shares require strong and durable execution. Valuation becomes attractive only when the return implied by conservative assumptions compensates for the business risks.
What is Apollo Hospitals’ main advantage?
The core advantage is a national hospital brand with mature-bed economics and multiple healthcare touchpoints. The evidence to follow is whether that advantage continues to produce stable market share, margins and returns on capital.
What is the biggest risk to the target model?
A rich multiple, hospital capex, regulated pricing and 2.49% promoter pledge require close attention; recent profit growth may normalise. A lower growth rate and a lower multiple can occur together, which is why the bear path changes both variables.
Does Apollo Hospitals pay a dividend?
The dividend yield was 0.22%. It is secondary to earnings growth, and future payouts remain subject to board decisions and cash needs.
When are Apollo Hospitals’ next results?
Use the results calendar for the announced date and check the exchange filing before relying on an estimate.
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Sources: Screener.in company financials, reviewed as at 6 August 2026; company results, annual reports and exchange filings linked from that page. Live market price is supplied separately by Yahoo Finance and is indicative.
This article is research and education, not personalised investment advice. We are not SEBI-registered advisers. Price targets are scenario arithmetic, not promises. Do your own research and consult a registered adviser before acting.