Ecos Mobility Share Price Today and Targets for 2026 to 2030
- Market Cap
- ₹671 Cr
- Book Value
- ₹44.28
- Stock P/E
- 11.39
- Dividend Yield
- 2.13%
- ROE
- —
- ROCE
- 30.32%
- PEG Ratio
- —
- EV/EBITDA
- —
Fundamentals from Screener.in, as of 10 Sep 2026. Live price via Yahoo Finance.
Technical snapshot
EOD ·Ecos (India) Mobility Ltd closed at ₹107.47 on 15 September 2026, down 3.8% on the day, 12.2% below its 50-day average, 63.5% below its 52-week high, with volume at 1.13× its 20-session average.
- RSI 14
- 26.9
- vs 50-day SMA
- -12.2%
- vs 200-day SMA
- -28.3%
- From 52-week high
- -63.5%
- Relative volume
- 1.13×
- 20-day return
- -4.5%
End-of-day prices from exchange-published files (NSE/BSE bhavcopy), updated after market close. Descriptive statistics, not investment advice.
Ecos Mobility share price today
Anyone typing ecos mobility share price into a search box in September 2026 lands on a genuinely awkward-looking set of numbers. Here is a company earning a return on capital employed above 30%, carrying almost no debt, paying a dividend that yields over 2%, and trading at roughly eleven times trailing earnings. On the usual screens that combination looks like a mistake. The share price says it is not a mistake at all.
At the 10 September 2026 close, Yahoo Finance showed a price of about ₹111.78, a market capitalisation of roughly ₹671 crore and trailing EPS of ₹9.81. That is about 11.4 times trailing earnings and 2.53 times a book value of ₹44.28 a share. The same session put the 52-week high at ₹290.20 and the 52-week low at ₹104.84, which means the stock was sitting about 61.5% below its 52-week high and only a few rupees above its 52-week low. The quote widget above will move after publication; every ratio and scenario input below stays fixed to that cut-off.
The tension in Ecos (India) Mobility is not hidden in a footnote. Revenue for the year to March 2026 rose to ₹808 crore from ₹654 crore, and yet reported net profit slipped to ₹58 crore from ₹60 crore. Growth arrived; the profit that was supposed to come with it did not. A low multiple is the market’s way of saying it expects that pattern to persist.
What Ecos (India) Mobility actually sells
Ecos is a corporate ground-transportation company. Its core service is chauffeur-driven car rental for businesses, which in practice means moving employees between home and office, moving visiting executives and delegations, and running the transport desk for conferences, events and hotels. Around that core sit adjacent lines: self-drive car rental, wedding car hire, a travel partner programme, and specialty vehicles including luggage vans, limousines, vintage cars and vehicles adapted for passengers with disabilities.
The customer list, as described in the company’s own business summary, is a list of India’s white-collar employers: information technology, business process outsourcing, global capability centres, consultancy, healthcare, e-commerce, pharmaceuticals, legal services and manufacturing. The company was incorporated in 1996, is based in New Delhi, and employed 1,271 people at the date of the captured figures.
| Service line | What the customer is buying | Economic character |
|---|---|---|
| Employee transportation | Home-office-home movement, run as a managed service | Contracted, repeatable, volume-led |
| Corporate car rental | Chauffeur-driven cars for executives and visitors | Tied to corporate travel budgets |
| Conference and event transport | Fleet and coordination for a defined event | Lumpy, project-shaped |
| Hotel travel desk | Outsourced transport for a hotel’s guests | Partnership-led, hospitality cycle |
| Specialty vehicles | Limousines, vintage cars, accessible vehicles | Niche, higher ticket, low volume |
| Self-drive rental | Car without a driver | Different economics from the chauffeured core |
Two things follow from that list. The first is that the revenue base is corporate discretionary spend, which is exactly the line item companies trim when they want a quick cost saving. The second is that headcount of 1,271 against revenue of ₹838 crore tells you the fleet and much of the driver base are not sitting on the company’s own payroll or balance sheet. That single observation explains most of what follows.
The two years of financials that are actually available
This is the point at which honesty about the data matters more than a tidy table. No multi-year Screener financial statement was captured for Ecos when the figures behind this article were compiled. What exists is two annual periods from Yahoo Finance, four quarters of revenue with no accompanying profit line, and a set of return and growth ratios compiled from Screener-derived data on 5 August 2026. Where a five-year revenue and margin history would normally sit, this article shows what was captured and nothing more. No quarterly profit figures are printed below because none were available to print.
| Financial year to March | Revenue | Net profit | Reading |
|---|---|---|---|
| FY25 | ₹654 Cr | ₹60 Cr | Base year for the comparison |
| FY26 | ₹808 Cr | ₹58 Cr | Revenue up about 23.5%, profit down slightly |
| TTM at 10 Sep 2026 | ₹838 Cr | Not separately captured | Trailing EPS of ₹9.81 on 6.0 crore shares |
That FY25-to-FY26 line is the whole argument. Revenue climbed by roughly a quarter and net profit went nowhere. On Yahoo’s basis the trailing profit margin was 7.01% and the trailing operating margin 7.42%, with EBITDA of about ₹96 crore on ₹838 crore of revenue, or an EBITDA margin near 11.5%. The gap between the EBITDA margin and the operating margin is where depreciation and lease-type charges live.
Against that, the longer-dated growth figures look almost fictional. The Screener-derived compilation of 5 August 2026 put the five-year sales CAGR at 51.37% and the five-year profit CAGR at 136.39%. Both are real calculations and both are close to useless as a description of the present. A 136% five-year profit CAGR sitting next to a small profit decline in the most recent year tells you the compound rate is anchored on a badly depressed starting point. Corporate ground transport was one of the businesses that effectively stopped during the pandemic years. The five-year numbers measure a recovery that has already happened. They do not forecast one that has not.
Four quarters of revenue, and what they leave out
| Quarter as labelled by the data source | Revenue | Change on prior quarter |
|---|---|---|
| 3Q2025 | ₹214 Cr | Opening figure of the captured series |
| 4Q2025 | ₹206 Cr | Down about 3.7% |
| 1Q2026 | ₹207 Cr | Up about 0.5% |
| 2Q2026 | ₹211 Cr | Up about 1.9% |
| Sum of four quarters | ₹838 Cr | Matches the trailing revenue figure |
Read that column downward and the picture is not growth or decline. It is a plateau. Four consecutive quarters between ₹206 crore and ₹214 crore is a business running at an annualised rate near ₹840 crore and staying there. The most recent quarter, at ₹211 crore, is below the ₹214 crore print three quarters earlier at the start of the captured series.
That flat line, more than any ratio, is what a P/E of 11 is responding to. Yahoo separately reported year-on-year revenue growth of 16.7% and year-on-year earnings growth of 9.5% on its own comparison basis, so the business is not shrinking. But a company whose sequential revenue has been horizontal for a year is not, on the current evidence, a compounder. It is a recovered business waiting for a second act.
High ROCE with thin margins: how both are true at once
The return figure is the one that makes people look twice. ROCE of 30.32% alongside an operating margin of 7.42% seems contradictory until you look at the denominator. Book value of ₹44.28 a share across 6.0 crore shares implies net worth of roughly ₹266 crore. Total debt was about ₹8 crore, a debt-to-equity ratio of 2.9%.
So the company is generating ₹838 crore of revenue on a capital base of under ₹300 crore. That is capital turning over roughly three times a year. When a business turns its capital that fast, even a 7% margin produces a high return on capital. The arithmetic is doing the work, not the pricing power. If you want the mechanics of why this happens, the fundamental analysis guide walks through how turnover and margin combine into a return figure.
The strategic reading is that Ecos does not appear to own the capital-heavy part of its own value chain. A chauffeur-drive operator that owned and depreciated a national fleet would show a far larger asset base, far more debt and a far lower ROCE. This one shows the opposite. That is a genuine structural advantage in a downturn, because the cost base flexes. It is also a structural ceiling on margin, because the economics of the vehicle sit with someone else.
A balance sheet with more cash than debt
| Balance-sheet item | 10 September 2026 figure | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|
| Total cash | ₹137 Cr | Comfortably covers all borrowings several times over |
| Total debt | ₹8 Cr | Effectively a rounding error against equity |
| Net cash | About ₹129 Cr | Roughly a fifth of the entire market capitalisation |
| Debt-to-equity | 2.9% | Solvency is not a live question here |
| Net worth | About ₹266 Cr | Book value ₹44.28 across 6.0 crore shares |
A market capitalisation of ₹671 crore that contains about ₹129 crore of net cash means the operating business is being valued at roughly ₹542 crore. Against ₹838 crore of revenue and ₹96 crore of EBITDA, that is not a demanding price for the operations. Whether it is a cheap one depends entirely on whether the revenue line resumes moving. A useful cross-check on the leverage side is the debt-to-equity ratio guide, which explains why a 2.9% reading effectively removes financial risk from the analysis.
The 71% promoter holding cuts both ways. It aligns the controlling family with minority holders and it keeps the free float small, which in a ₹671 crore company means the price can move a long way on modest volume. The FII and DII splits were not part of the captured data, so no claim is made about institutional participation.
Ecos Mobility share price against its own 52-week range
| Price reference | Level | Distance from ₹111.78 |
|---|---|---|
| 52-week high, 10 Sep 2026 | ₹290.20 | Price is 61.5% below it |
| 52-week low, 10 Sep 2026 | ₹104.84 | Price is about 6.6% above it |
| 52-week high, 5 Aug 2026 compilation | ₹299.75 | The high in the rolling window has since edged down |
| Market capitalisation, 5 Aug 2026 | ₹777 Cr | Against ₹671 Cr on 10 September |
On the 5 August compilation the stock was about 56.8% below its high; five weeks later that gap had widened to 61.5%, so the decline was still in progress at the cut-off. A drawdown of this size is information, not noise. It is also not, by itself, an argument. A stock 61% off its high can be mispriced or it can be correctly repriced to a lower growth rate. The four flat quarters above suggest the second explanation deserves the benefit of the doubt until the revenue line disagrees.
Valuation at the 10 September 2026 cut-off
| Valuation measure | Reading at the cut-off | Interpretation |
|---|---|---|
| Price | About ₹111.78 | Fixed research input, not a live figure |
| Market capitalisation | About ₹671 Cr | Micro-cap; liquidity and float matter |
| Trailing EPS | ₹9.81 | Yahoo Finance trailing basis |
| Recalculated P/E | About 11.39× | Price divided by trailing EPS |
| Book value per share | ₹44.28 | Implies price-to-book of 2.53× |
| ROCE | 30.32% | From the Screener-derived compilation of 5 August 2026 |
| Dividend yield | 2.13% | Income is a real part of the total return here |
| Promoter holding | 71% | Small free float |
Eleven times earnings is a low multiple in absolute terms and an entirely rational one if profit stays where it is. The FY26 result showed profit falling on a rising revenue base, and a business priced at 11 times flat earnings is worth about what it is priced at. The valuation only becomes interesting if the earnings line starts moving again. If you want the reasoning behind how a P/E should be read in a case like this, the P/E ratio guide covers when a low multiple is a discount and when it is an accurate forecast.
Return on capital is the counterweight. A 30% ROCE with almost no debt is a real quality signal, and it says the capital that is deployed is deployed well. What it cannot tell you is whether there is more capital to deploy at that rate. A high-ROCE business with nowhere to reinvest becomes a dividend stock, which is a legitimate outcome but a different one from a growth story.
Valuation framework
The scenario model starts with TTM EPS of ₹9.81. For each year it applies EPS_TTM × (1 + growth)^(year − 2026 + 112/365) × exit P/E, then rounds the result to the nearest ₹5. The 112/365 factor represents the fraction of the first forecast year remaining from 10 September to 31 December. Dividends are excluded from the model even though the yield is material.
| Scenario | Annual EPS growth | Exit P/E | Business interpretation |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bear | 5% | 8× | Corporate travel budgets tighten, the revenue plateau extends, margins stay near 7% and the multiple compresses further |
| Base | 10% | 11× | Revenue resumes low-double-digit growth, profit finally tracks it, and the market keeps paying roughly today’s multiple |
| Bull | 16% | 15× | Growth returns near the recent year-on-year rate, thin margins hold on higher volume, and the discount partially closes |
The multiple range is set deliberately close to the current 11.39×, with compression in the bear case and only a modest re-rating in the bull case. Assuming both a recovery in growth and a large permanent re-rating would just be optimism written twice. Even at 15× the bull case stops well short of whatever multiple the market was paying at a ₹290 share price. The bear case at 8× with 5% growth produces outcomes below the current price, which is the honest consequence of a business whose last reported year showed profit going backwards. The general method behind all three columns is set out in the how to value a stock guide.
Ecos Mobility share price target 2026 to 2030
The grid above is generated only from the disclosed EPS, growth rate and exit P/E inputs. It does not model a change in the number of shares, an acquisition, a contract win or loss, a shift in the vehicle-sourcing model, dividends received, or any change in the corporate travel cycle. The inputs should be replaced after the next reported result rather than carried forward unchanged.
Risks that can break the thesis
The first risk is demand. Employee transportation and corporate car rental are services companies buy with discretionary budgets. A hiring freeze at large IT services firms and global capability centres, or a durable shift toward fewer office days, reduces the number of trips regardless of how well Ecos executes. The four flat quarters may already be showing this.
The second is margin. At a 7% operating margin, a small movement in fuel, driver cost or vendor rates has a disproportionate effect on profit. FY26 demonstrated exactly this: 23.5% more revenue produced slightly less profit. If that relationship holds, revenue growth stops being good news.
The third is concentration and contract structure. Managed employee-transport contracts are typically won and re-tendered in blocks, and the captured data does not disclose customer concentration. Losing or repricing one large account is a meaningful event for a company of this size. The 29% free float amplifies the price effect of any such news.
The fourth is competitive. The barriers in ground transportation are operational, not structural. Ride-hailing platforms, regional fleet operators and in-house facility-management providers all compete for the same corporate budget, and none of them requires a licence Ecos holds exclusively.
What would change the picture
The constructive evidence is specific and easy to check. Sequential revenue breaking clearly above the ₹214 crore level would end the plateau. Operating margin moving above the 7.42% trailing level while revenue grows would show the FY26 profit stall was a one-year cost issue rather than a structural one. ROCE holding above 30% while the capital base grows would show there is somewhere to reinvest at that rate.
The picture weakens if quarterly revenue drifts back toward ₹200 crore, if the dividend is funded from a falling earnings base rather than a growing one, if the net cash position is spent on an acquisition outside the core service, or if another full year passes with revenue up and profit flat. Any of those would suggest the current multiple is a fair assessment rather than a discount.
Quarterly monitoring scorecard
| Question | Constructive evidence | Warning sign |
|---|---|---|
| Has the revenue plateau broken? | A quarter clearly above ₹214 Cr | Prints drifting back toward ₹200 Cr |
| Is profit tracking revenue again? | Profit growth at least matching sales growth | A second year of revenue up, profit flat |
| Are margins stabilising? | Operating margin above the 7.42% trailing level | Margin slipping while volume rises |
| Is capital still earning 30%? | ROCE held with a larger capital base | ROCE falling as the balance sheet grows |
| Is the balance sheet intact? | Net cash maintained, debt near nil | Cash deployed outside the core service |
| Is the dividend covered? | Payout funded by growing earnings | Yield rising only because the price fell |
What the current price appears to assume
Strip the story out and the market is making a fairly simple statement. It is paying about 11 times earnings and 2.5 times book for a near-debt-free company with ₹129 crore of net cash, a 30% return on capital and a 2.13% dividend yield, and in exchange it is assuming that the ₹840 crore revenue run-rate and the ₹58 crore profit level are roughly where this business sits for now.
That is a defensible assumption on the evidence available, and it is also the assumption most easily disproved. Ecos does not need a new business model to change the arithmetic; it needs the sequential revenue line to move and the margin to stop absorbing the growth. Neither had happened in the data captured to 10 September 2026. The quality signals are genuine, the balance sheet removes the risk of forced decisions, and the price has already fallen 61.5% from its high. What is missing is evidence that the plateau is temporary.
FAQ
What is Ecos Mobility’s share price target for 2026?
The 2026 figure in the scenario grid is produced by applying the partial-year formula to trailing EPS of ₹9.81 under three different growth and exit-P/E combinations. Because only about 112 days of 2026 remained at the cut-off, the 2026 outcome is dominated by the exit multiple rather than by the growth rate. It is a range of arithmetic outcomes, not a prediction.
What is Ecos Mobility’s share price target for 2030?
The 2030 column compounds trailing EPS forward at 5%, 10% and 16% respectively and applies exit multiples of 8×, 11× and 15×. Over four years the growth assumption starts to matter more than the multiple, which is why the spread between the three columns widens with time. Treat it as a sensitivity exercise on two variables, not a forecast.
What does Ecos (India) Mobility do?
It provides corporate ground transportation in India and internationally. The core service is chauffeur-driven car rental and employee home-office-home transport for corporate clients, alongside conference and event transport, hotel travel desks, wedding car rental, self-drive rental and specialty vehicles such as limousines, luggage vans and accessible vehicles. The company was incorporated in 1996 and is based in New Delhi.
What is the ticker of Ecos (India) Mobility on NSE and BSE?
The NSE symbol is ECOSMOBLTY, which appears as ECOSMOBLTY.NS on Yahoo Finance and other data feeds. The BSE scrip code was not among the figures captured for this article, so it is not stated here; the NSE quote page linked in the sources section is the canonical reference for the symbol and its filings.
Who are the promoters of Ecos (India) Mobility?
Promoter holding stood at 71% of equity at the cut-off, leaving a free float of 29%. Individual promoter names were not part of the captured data and are not listed here. The shareholding pattern filed with the exchange is the correct place to read the full promoter group and any changes to it.
What is the ROCE of Ecos (India) Mobility?
Return on capital employed was 30.32% in the Screener-derived figures compiled on 5 August 2026. That is high, and it comes from fast capital turnover rather than from fat margins: the company produced ₹838 crore of trailing revenue on net worth of roughly ₹266 crore with about ₹8 crore of debt. Return on equity was not captured, so it is not quoted.
Related research
- IRCTC share price target, the other listed Indian travel-services business with a corporate and consumer mix
- BLS International share price target, a comparably asset-light outsourced services operator
- How to read quarterly results, the skill this entire thesis turns on, because the next reported quarter decides it
- High-paying dividend stocks in India, for the case where a high-ROCE business with nowhere to reinvest becomes an income holding
Sources and methodology
- Ecos (India) Mobility on Screener.in
- Ecos (India) Mobility quote and filings on NSE
- Ecos (India) Mobility company website
Price, 52-week range, market capitalisation, trailing EPS, book value, cash, debt, margins, employee count, promoter holding and the two annual revenue and profit rows were captured from Yahoo Finance after the completed 10 September 2026 session. The return on capital employed, the five-year sales CAGR and the five-year profit CAGR come from Screener-derived figures compiled on 5 August 2026, which is why those three carry an earlier date than everything else. No multi-year Screener financial statement and no quarterly profit series was available for this company, so none is reproduced; the quarterly table shows revenue only, exactly as captured.
Business descriptions come from the company’s own reported summary. Analytical judgment begins with the interpretation of the four flat quarters, the reading of high ROCE as a turnover effect rather than a pricing-power effect, the assessment that the five-year CAGRs describe a completed recovery, and the choice of growth rates and exit multiples in the scenario framework. Those are opinions formed from the figures above, and they should be re-tested against the next reported result.
This article is research and education, not personalised investment advice or a recommendation to transact. Gale is not a SEBI-registered investment adviser. The scenarios are illustrations, not guarantees. Verify current exchange filings, liquidity, corporate actions and suitability, and consult a registered adviser before acting.