Uni Abex Share Price Target 2026–2030 and What Drives It
- Market Cap
- ₹928 Cr
- Book Value
- ₹2,099
- Stock P/E
- 20.20
- Dividend Yield
- 0.85%
- ROE
- 17.00%
- ROCE
- 19.20%
- PEG Ratio
- 0.55
- EV/EBITDA
- 13.7
Fundamentals from Screener.in, as of 10 Sep 2026. Live price via Yahoo Finance.
Technical snapshot
EOD ·Uni Abex Alloy Products Ltd closed at ₹4,599.70 on 11 September 2026, down 3.1% on the day, 6.1% below its 50-day average, 20.0% below its 52-week high, with volume at 1.49× its 20-session average.
- RSI 14
- 41.9
- vs 50-day SMA
- -6.1%
- vs 200-day SMA
- +22.0%
- From 52-week high
- -20.0%
- Relative volume
- 1.49×
- 20-day return
- -0.0%
End-of-day prices from exchange-published files (NSE/BSE bhavcopy), updated after market close. Descriptive statistics, not investment advice.
Uni Abex Alloy Products share price today
Anyone looking up the Uni Abex share price is looking at one of the smaller industrial names on the Indian market. Uni Abex Alloy Products was incorporated in 1972 and casts heat- and corrosion-resistant alloy components: reformer tubes for petrochemical furnaces, castings for decanter centrifuges, and static and centrifugal castings for the steel, petroleum and fertiliser industries. It sells hardware that is consumable in service but critical to the plant it sits in. The investment question is whether a decade of margin repair has changed the economics permanently, or whether it has simply coincided with a good process-plant capital cycle.
At the 10 September 2026 research cut-off, Screener showed a price of about ₹4,700, market capitalisation of roughly ₹928 crore and book value per share of ₹2,099. That is about 20.2 times earnings and 2.24 times book. The 52-week range runs from ₹2,650 to ₹5,750, which puts the share about 18.3% below its 52-week high after a period of very strong price momentum: Screener’s price CAGR series reads 50% over one year, 31% over three years and 49% a year over five.
One practical note before the numbers. Uni Abex is listed only on the BSE and has no NSE line, and the market-data feed that powers our live quote box is stale for that code. The quote box above can therefore lag or fail to load for this BSE-only code — treat it as indicative only. Every price, range and ratio below was captured from Screener.in on 10 September 2026 and does not update after publication.
What Uni Abex Alloy Products actually makes
The company manufactures static and centrifugal castings and assemblies in heat- and corrosion-resistant alloys, and describes itself as a leader in alloy steel castings for decanters and reformer tubes. Its customers are OEMs, EPC contractors and the steel, petroleum, fertiliser and petrochemical industries. It holds ISO 9001, ISO 14001 and ISO 45001 certification and One Star Export House recognition.
| End market | What Uni Abex supplies | Why the spend is hard to defer |
|---|---|---|
| Petrochemical and refinery furnaces | Reformer tubes and heat-resistant castings | Tubes degrade in high-temperature service and are replaced on turnaround schedules |
| Fertiliser plants | Heat-resistant alloy castings and assemblies | Reformers run continuously; a failed component stops the plant |
| Steel | Corrosion- and heat-resistant castings | Process furnaces consume alloy parts as a running cost |
| Separation equipment | Alloy castings for decanter centrifuges | Wear parts on rotating machinery need periodic replacement |
| OEMs and EPC contractors | Cast and machined assemblies | Parts are qualified into equipment designs, so switching supplier means re-qualification |
| Accreditation | ISO 9001, ISO 14001, ISO 45001; One Star Export House | Vendor approvals are a precondition for critical-service castings |
That replacement character is the most attractive feature of the business. A reformer tube is not a discretionary purchase for a running ammonia or hydrogen plant, and a qualified casting supplier is not swapped casually. The offsetting feature is that demand still tracks heavy-industry capital and maintenance cycles, which are lumpy on a revenue base this small.
Uni Abex is part of the Neterwala Group, whose other arms span metallurgy, oil-and-gas services, engineering and environmental monitoring. Group affiliation gives the company a longer institutional history than its market capitalisation suggests, but it does not by itself create pricing power.
The FY26 earnings figure is not a run rate
This is the single most important thing to understand before reading any valuation of this stock. Screener’s trailing twelve-month EPS for Uni Abex is ₹1,425.58. That number should not be used as an earnings base.
FY26 net profit was ₹280 crore on sales of ₹219 crore. Profit larger than revenue only happens when a one-off gain lands in the income statement, and Screener’s own data flags the FY26 profit as including a large exceptional item. The prior year’s EPS on the same reported basis was ₹169.97. Screener’s P/E of 20.2 against a price of ₹4,700 implies a normalised trailing EPS of about ₹232.7, and that normalised figure is the one the scenario model on this page uses.
| Earnings measure | Value | How to treat it |
|---|---|---|
| Reported FY26 EPS | ₹1,417.01 | Includes a large exceptional gain; not a run rate |
| Reported TTM EPS | ₹1,425.58 | Carries the same distortion |
| FY25 EPS | ₹169.97 | Last clean full year in Screener’s series |
| FY24 EPS | ₹179.54 | Higher than FY25 |
| Normalised TTM EPS used here | ₹232.7 | Implied by the ₹4,700 price and the 20.2× P/E |
| FY26 dividend payout ratio | 7% | Fell from 21% because the payout base included the one-off |
Two other lines corroborate the read. Reserves jumped from ₹140 crore at FY25 to ₹413 crore at FY26, and total assets went from ₹196 crore to ₹493 crore, while sales rose only about 13%. The dividend payout ratio dropping to 7% is the arithmetic consequence of a much larger denominator, not a cut in the rupee dividend. The data available here does not identify what produced the exceptional gain, and this article does not speculate about it.
The accounts: a turnaround, then a scale-up
Uni Abex was losing money in the middle of the last decade. FY17 recorded sales of ₹62 crore, a negative operating margin and a loss of ₹8 crore. The recovery that followed is real and is visible in every line.
| Financial year | Sales | Operating margin | Net profit | EPS |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FY17 | ₹62 Cr | −0.8% | −₹8 Cr | −₹42.58 |
| FY19 | ₹90 Cr | 18% | ₹9 Cr | ₹47.65 |
| FY21 | ₹105 Cr | 20% | ₹11 Cr | ₹54.13 |
| FY23 | ₹163 Cr | 17% | ₹19 Cr | ₹93.82 |
| FY24 | ₹180 Cr | 27% | ₹35 Cr | ₹179.54 |
| FY25 | ₹193 Cr | 23% | ₹34 Cr | ₹169.97 |
| FY26 | ₹219 Cr | 24% | ₹280 Cr | ₹1,417.01 |
| TTM | ₹221 Cr | 22% | ₹282 Cr | ₹1,425.58 |
FY26 and TTM profit and EPS include the exceptional gain described above and should not be compared with the earlier rows.
Two details deserve more weight than the headline improvement. First, growth has decelerated. Screener’s sales CAGR reads 13% over ten years and 16% over five, but only 10% over three years, with 17% on a trailing basis. A three-year rate below the five-year rate is the shape of a business that enjoyed a strong stretch and has since normalised.
Second, FY25 shows that profit is not a straight line here. Sales rose from ₹180 crore to ₹193 crore, yet operating margin fell from 27% to 23%, net profit slipped from ₹35 crore to ₹34 crore and EPS fell from ₹179.54 to ₹169.97. On a base this small, one bad mix year or one input-cost move is enough to reverse a year of earnings growth.
The profit CAGRs Screener reports (34% over ten years, 35% over five, 37% over three and 45% trailing) all terminate in a year that contains the exceptional gain. They overstate the operating trend and should not be used as a forecast input.
Margins and returns on capital
Uni Abex earns respectable returns for a foundry. The operating margin has held above 20% since FY24 — 27% in FY24, 23% in FY25, 24% in FY26 and 22% trailing — and both return ratios are comfortably above the cost of capital most investors would apply to a micro-cap industrial.
| Measure | Reading |
|---|---|
| Operating margin, headline ratio | 23.56% |
| Operating margin, trailing twelve months | 22% |
| ROCE, latest | 19.20% |
| ROCE, five-year average | 29.84% |
| ROE, latest | 17.00% |
| ROE, three-year average | 23% |
| ROE, five-year average | 23% |
| ROE, ten-year average | 20% |
The gap between the latest ROCE of 19.2% and the five-year average of 29.84% is the most informative number in the table, and it follows directly from the FY26 event. Retaining a large exceptional gain inflates the capital employed denominator immediately while adding nothing to operating profit, so the ratio falls even though the underlying business did not deteriorate. The same mechanism pulls ROE from a 23% three-year average down to 17%. If you want the arithmetic behind why an enlarged equity base drags this ratio down, the return on equity guide works through it.
The practical consequence is that Uni Abex now has to redeploy that capital into something that earns near the old rate, or accept structurally lower return ratios. Which of those happens is the main thing the next two annual reports will reveal.
The balance sheet after an unusual year
| Balance-sheet line | FY24 | FY25 | FY26 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Equity capital | ₹2 Cr | ₹2 Cr | ₹2 Cr |
| Reserves | ₹111 Cr | ₹140 Cr | ₹413 Cr |
| Borrowings | ₹19 Cr | ₹13 Cr | ₹13 Cr |
| Total assets | ₹162 Cr | ₹196 Cr | ₹493 Cr |
There is no solvency question here. Borrowings are ₹13 crore against reserves of ₹413 crore, and debt to equity is 0.03. Uni Abex has more balance-sheet capacity than it has ever had, at a moment when its end markets are spending.
The flip side is that total assets more than doubled in a single year while sales grew about 13%. An asset base that grows far faster than revenue is either a deliberate investment in future capacity or idle capital. Nothing in the data settles which, and the distinction determines whether the return ratios in the previous section recover or stay where they are.
Ownership, liquidity and the BSE-only listing
| Holder | Stake |
|---|---|
| Promoters | 63.63% |
| Foreign institutional investors | 0.01% |
| Domestic institutional investors | 0.02% |
| Public | 36.35% |
| Promoter shares pledged | 0% |
Zero promoter pledge on a 63.63% holding is a genuine positive. Combined institutional ownership of 0.03% is not a positive or a negative so much as a description of what this share is: a ₹928 crore company on one exchange with no professional holders, no sell-side coverage and a public float that is effectively all retail.
That has three consequences worth stating plainly. Bid-ask spreads and impact cost are real considerations, not a rounding error. Price can move a long way on modest volume, which cuts both directions and helps explain a 52-week range that spans ₹2,650 to ₹5,750. And there is no institutional bid to support the stock if sentiment toward small industrials turns. Position size matters more here than the precision of any valuation model.
Valuation at the research cut-off
| Valuation measure | 10 September 2026 reading | Interpretation |
|---|---|---|
| Price | About ₹4,700 | Completed-session Screener price, not a live quote |
| Market capitalisation | About ₹928 Cr | Micro-cap, single exchange |
| Normalised trailing EPS | ₹232.7 | Implied by price divided by the 20.2× P/E |
| P/E | 20.2× | On normalised, not reported, earnings |
| Book value per share | ₹2,099 | Price to book of 2.24× |
| EV / EBITDA | 13.7 | |
| PEG | 0.55 | Uses a growth rate inflated by the FY26 one-off |
| Dividend yield | 0.85% | Payout ratio fell to 7% in FY26 |
| Debt to equity | 0.03 | Balance sheet is not the constraint |
| 52-week range | ₹2,650 to ₹5,750 | About 18.3% below the high |
The PEG of 0.55 is the figure most likely to be quoted out of context. Dividing a P/E of 20.2 by a PEG of 0.55 implies a growth input near 37%, which is exactly Screener’s three-year profit CAGR, and that series ends in the year containing the exceptional gain. A PEG built on a distorted growth rate is not evidence of cheapness. The P/E ratio guide explains why the denominator you feed a multiple matters more than the multiple itself.
What is defensible on the numbers as they stand: 20.2 times normalised earnings and 2.24 times book for a business earning a 19.2% ROCE with almost no debt is neither obviously stretched nor obviously cheap. It is a fair price for a decent foundry, which means the return from here depends on operating performance rather than on a re-rating.
Valuation framework
The scenario model starts with normalised TTM EPS of ₹232.7.
For each year it applies EPS_TTM × (1 + growth)^(year − 2026 + 112/365) × exit P/E, then rounds the result to the nearest ₹5.
The 112/365 factor represents the fraction of the first forecast year remaining from 10 September to 31 December.
| Scenario | Annual EPS growth | Exit P/E | Business interpretation |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bear | 8% | 13× | Process-plant capex cools, margin drifts back toward the high teens and a BSE-only micro-cap de-rates |
| Base | 13% | 19× | Replacement demand and export approvals hold, margin stays near the low twenties, the rating is roughly unchanged |
| Bull | 18% | 24× | The enlarged balance sheet is deployed into capacity earning close to the old 29.84% ROCE, and the register broadens |
The growth rates are anchored on the sales CAGRs (13% over ten years, 16% over five, 10% over three), not on the profit CAGRs, because the exceptional gain distorts every profit series that ends in FY26. Even the bull case of 18% sits above the five-year sales rate, on the assumption that operating leverage carries earnings faster than revenue.
The multiples deliberately bracket the current 20.2×. A company with 0.03% institutional ownership on a single exchange rarely sustains a premium rating for long, so the bull exit multiple is only modestly above today’s, and the bear case assumes a de-rating rather than an earnings collapse. Dividends are excluded. The general method behind this arithmetic is set out in the stock valuation guide; these are scenarios, not probability-weighted forecasts.
Uni Abex Alloy Products share price target 2026 to 2030
The grid above is generated only from the disclosed normalised EPS, the three growth rates and the three exit multiples, with 2026 pro-rated for the part of the year remaining after the cut-off. It does not model a further exceptional item, an acquisition, a share issue or buyback, a change in the alloy or nickel input cost cycle, an order-book shock from a single large customer, or the liquidity discount a BSE-only micro-cap can carry. It also assumes smooth annual compounding, which FY25 already showed this company does not deliver. Reset the inputs after the next audited full-year result rather than carrying these forward.
What moves the Uni Abex share price
Five things drive the Uni Abex share price more than anything in a spreadsheet.
The first is the maintenance and turnaround cycle at refineries, petrochemical crackers and fertiliser plants, because reformer tubes and furnace castings are replaced on those schedules. The second is steel and direct-reduced-iron capacity utilisation, which sets consumption of heat-resistant parts. The third is export approvals and the qualification status that lets the company supply overseas OEMs and EPC contractors, since qualification is the barrier that keeps a foundry from competing purely on price.
The fourth is what happens to the ₹413 crore of reserves now sitting on the balance sheet. Deployed into qualified capacity, that capital could lift earnings materially from a ₹221 crore revenue base. Left idle, it permanently dilutes the return ratios that make the stock interesting. The fifth is simply the float. With 36.35% public holding and effectively no institutions, the price responds to small changes in demand for the shares themselves, which is why the 52-week high of ₹5,750 is more than twice the low of ₹2,650.
Risks that can break the thesis
The clearest risk is cyclicality on a small base. Revenue is ₹221 crore trailing. A deferred turnaround at two or three large customers, or one delayed export order, moves a full quarter. FY25 is the worked example: sales rose, margin fell from 27% to 23% and EPS declined.
Deceleration is the second risk, and it is already in the data. A three-year sales CAGR of 10% against a five-year rate of 16% says the fastest part of the recovery is behind the company. If 10% is the new normal, the base and bull growth assumptions above are too generous.
The third is return dilution. ROCE at 19.2% against a five-year average of 29.84% is not yet a problem, but it becomes one if the enlarged asset base sits unused for two more years. The fourth is input cost: alloy and nickel prices pass through castings with a lag, and margin is the shock absorber.
The fifth is the listing and the register. BSE-only quotation, no NSE line, no institutional holders and no analyst coverage together mean poor price discovery, and they are also why the live quote on this page can lag the exchange. Finally, the starting point matters. A share that has compounded at roughly 50% over one year and 49% a year over five has already been re-rated once. Buying after that re-rating requires the earnings to arrive, not merely the story.
What would change the view
Most of what matters here is a test on the reported numbers, and the scorecard below sets those out line by line. Two conditions sit outside it, because neither one shows up as a ratio.
The first is the listing itself. An NSE line would address the liquidity discount directly. It would widen the pool of buyers, narrow the spread, and remove the single structural reason a professional holder cannot build a position here without moving the price against itself. No amount of operating improvement substitutes for that, which is why a company with these return ratios still trades with 0.03% institutional ownership.
The second is the shape of any new borrowing. Debt of ₹13 crore against ₹413 crore of reserves is not a solvency question and will not become one soon, so what matters is not the leverage but what a rise from that level would imply. A company sitting on reserves that large and borrowing anyway is saying something about the cost, the timing or the availability of its own internal capital. Borrowing for working capital, or for a purpose the company does not specify, in the year after a large one-off gain landed, is the version of that signal worth acting on.
Monitoring scorecard
| Question | Constructive evidence | Warning sign |
|---|---|---|
| Is the operating business still growing? | Sales growth moves back toward the five-year 16% CAGR | Another year near the three-year 10% rate |
| Is margin holding? | Operating margin stays in the 22% to 24% band | Slippage below the FY25 level of 23% |
| Is the enlarged balance sheet earning? | ROCE climbs from 19.2% toward the 29.84% five-year average | Assets stay near ₹493 Cr while profit does not follow |
| Is reported profit clean? | A full year with no exceptional line, and operating EPS above ₹232.7 | Repeated one-offs in headline EPS |
| Is the ₹413 Cr actually being spent? | A named capacity project with a rupee number and a commissioning date | Reserves rise again with no project identified |
| Is the dividend rising in rupees? | Rupee dividend per share increases year on year | Rupee dividend flat while the payout ratio optically recovers |
| How concentrated is the order book? | No single turnaround or export order swings a quarter | Revenue timing again driven by two or three customers |
| Is export qualification advancing? | New OEM or EPC approvals disclosed, widening the addressable base | Approvals lapse, or go unreported for a full year |
| Is the register broadening? | Any institutional entry against today’s 0.03% | Float remains as thin and as retail as it is now |
FAQ
What is Uni Abex’s share price target for 2026?
The 2026 row of the scenario grid applies normalised trailing EPS of ₹232.7, three growth rates and three exit multiples, and pro-rates the year for the 112/365 of it remaining after 10 September 2026. It is a range of arithmetic outcomes on stated assumptions, not a forecast and not a recommendation. Reset it once the next audited result is published.
What is the Uni Abex share price target for 2030?
The 2030 row uses the same engine extended four more years. Because the model compounds, small differences in the growth rate or the exit multiple produce very large differences by 2030, so the spread between the scenarios matters more than any single number in it. Treat it as a sensitivity exercise.
What does Uni Abex Alloy Products do?
It manufactures static and centrifugal castings and assemblies in heat- and corrosion-resistant alloys, including reformer tubes for petrochemical furnaces and castings for decanter centrifuges. Customers are OEMs, EPC contractors and the steel, petroleum, fertiliser and petrochemical industries. The company was incorporated in 1972 and is part of the Neterwala Group.
What is the ROCE of Uni Abex Alloy Products?
Screener’s latest reading is 19.20%, against a five-year average of 29.84%. The gap is largely mechanical: FY26 retained a large exceptional gain, which lifted reserves from ₹140 crore to ₹413 crore and enlarged the capital employed denominator without adding operating profit. Whether ROCE recovers depends on how that capital is deployed.
Who are the promoters of Uni Abex Alloy Products?
Promoters hold 63.63% of the company, with no shares pledged, and Uni Abex is part of the Neterwala Group. Foreign institutions hold 0.01% and domestic institutions 0.02%, so the 36.35% public float is almost entirely non-institutional.
Where are Uni Abex Alloy Products shares listed?
On the BSE only, under scrip code 504605. There is no NSE listing. That single fact explains why the live quote on this page can be stale, the absence of institutional holders and much of the volatility in the 52-week range.
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Sources and methodology
- Uni Abex Alloy Products on Screener.in
- Uni Abex Alloy Products corporate site
- Uni Abex investor relations and disclosures
- Neterwala Group
Every figure in this article was captured on 10 September 2026. Price, market capitalisation, the 52-week range, P/E, book value per share, PEG, EV/EBITDA, dividend yield, ROE, ROCE, operating margin, debt to equity, the shareholding pattern, the annual sales, margin, profit, EPS and payout series and the balance-sheet lines all come from Screener.in. Yahoo Finance carries the 504605.BO code, but its feed for this BSE-only line is stale, so no Yahoo figure is used anywhere here and the live quote box, which draws on that feed, should not be used in place of the Screener figures quoted here. The business description and end markets come from Screener’s company profile and from the company’s own site and its group’s site.
Analytical judgment begins with the normalisation of EPS. Screener’s reported trailing EPS of ₹1,425.58 is distorted by the FY26 exceptional gain, so this article uses the ₹232.7 implied by the price and the published P/E, and says so wherever earnings are discussed. The scenario growth rates, the exit multiples, the reading of the ROCE decline as a denominator effect, the view that three-year sales growth of 10% signals deceleration, and every statement about liquidity and the listing are interpretation, not reported data.
This article is research and education, not personalised investment advice or a recommendation to transact. Gale is not a SEBI-registered investment adviser. The scenarios are illustrations, not guarantees. Verify current exchange filings, liquidity, corporate actions and suitability, and consult a registered adviser before acting.