Kewal Kiran Clothing Share Price Today and Targets for 2026 to 2030

Kewal Kiran Clothing share price today

Most people who look up the kewal kiran clothing share price already know at least one of the labels: Killer and Lawman jeans have been on Indian shop shelves for decades. What the market has to decide is narrower than brand recognition. This is a Mumbai-based garment manufacturer, founded in 1980, that owns its brands, runs its own factories and sells through a mixed network of exclusive outlets, large-format stores, multi-brand dealers and e-commerce platforms. The question is whether that structure still converts sales growth into profit growth.

At the 10 September 2026 research cut-off, the completed-session price was ₹505.65, market capitalisation was about ₹3,126 crore and trailing EPS was ₹23.97. That works out to roughly 21.1 times trailing earnings and 3.33 times a book value of ₹152.31 per share. The stock sat about 14.6% below its 52-week high of ₹592, against a 52-week low of ₹413.05. The live quote above will move after publication; every ratio and scenario input below stays fixed to the stated cut-off.

The tension in the numbers is easy to state. Revenue has risen every year since FY23. Reported net profit peaked in FY24 and has fallen in each of the two years since. A company can grow sales and shrink earnings for a while without anything being wrong, but not indefinitely, and the valuation the market is paying rests on which of the two lines is the better guide to the next five years.

What Kewal Kiran Clothing actually sells

The business is branded readymade garments and finished accessories, sold in India and internationally. The product range covers jeans, shirts, trousers, t-shirts, winterwear and accessories. The brand portfolio is Killer, Easies, Lawman, Junior Killer, Kraus, Integriti and Desi Belle. That is a multi-brand house rather than a single-label business, which spreads fashion risk across price points but also spreads marketing and inventory across more stock-keeping units than a focused brand would carry.

Element	What the disclosure states	Why it matters to the numbers
Brand portfolio	Killer, Easies, Lawman, Junior Killer, Kraus, Integriti, Desi Belle	Owned brands, so pricing and margin are not a contract-manufacturing pass-through
Product range	Jeans, shirts, trousers, t-shirts, winterwear, accessories	Denim-led with adjacent categories added around it
Channels	Exclusive brand outlets, large-format stores, multi-brand outlets, e-commerce	Four channels with different discount, credit and returns behaviour
Geography	India and international	India-led, with an international presence; no country-wise revenue split was captured
Scale	1,868 employees; about ₹1,258 crore trailing revenue	Manufacturing and distribution overhead is carried in-house
Classification	Consumer Cyclical sector, Apparel Manufacturing industry	Discretionary spending, so volumes track the consumption cycle

Owning the brand is the economically important part. A garment maker that supplies someone else’s label earns a conversion margin; a brand owner keeps the gap between manufactured cost and retail price, and pays for it with advertising, inventory and the risk that a season does not sell. Kewal Kiran sits on the brand-owner side of that line, which is why its operating margin should be read against apparel brands rather than against job-work manufacturers. The same comparison is useful when reading Page Industries share price target or Vedant Fashions share price target, both of which sit in the same part of the market with very different category economics.

FY23 to FY26: sales grew, profit did not

Here is the four-year record as reported, with the net margin computed from the same two columns. The annual rows are labelled by the calendar year in which the March financial year ended, so the row marked 2026 is FY26.

Financial year	Revenue	Net profit	Net profit margin
FY23	₹779 Cr	₹119 Cr	15.3%
FY24	₹861 Cr	₹155 Cr	18.0%
FY25	₹1,003 Cr	₹141 Cr	14.1%
FY26	₹1,213 Cr	₹132 Cr	10.9%
Trailing twelve months	₹1,258 Cr	About ₹149 Cr implied	11.84% as reported

Revenue rose about 55.7% across the three years from FY23 to FY26, a compound rate near 15.9%. Net profit over the same three years went from ₹119 crore to ₹132 crore, a compound rate of roughly 3.5%. The margin tells the story more directly: 18.0% in FY24, then 14.1%, then 10.9%. Something between the top line and the bottom line absorbed the growth, whether that was discounting, channel mix, advertising, employee cost or a step-up in capacity that has not yet been filled. The captured material does not break that down, so the honest position is that the cause is visible in outcome but not in composition.

The trailing row is the more encouraging one. Trailing revenue of ₹1,258 crore at the reported 11.84% profit margin implies about ₹149 crore of trailing profit, and trailing EPS of ₹23.97 across roughly 6.16 crore shares outstanding points at very nearly the same number. That is above the ₹132 crore reported for FY26. The trailing window is not an audited financial year, so treat it as a sign that recent quarters have run better than FY26 as a whole rather than as a settled result.

Why the five-year CAGR and the three-year record disagree

The Screener-derived figures captured on 5 August 2026 show a five-year sales CAGR of 31.99% and a five-year profit CAGR of 48.06%. Those are large numbers, and they sit awkwardly beside a three-year profit CAGR of about 3.5%. Both can be arithmetically correct at once. A five-year window that starts in a depressed year produces a flattering compound rate for several years afterwards, and the recovery is counted as growth long after it has finished.

This matters because the reported PEG of 0.48 is built directly on the larger number. Dividing the 5 August P/E of 23.24 by the five-year profit CAGR of 48.06 gives 0.48, which is exactly the figure shown. The ratio is doing what it is designed to do; the input is the problem. A PEG under 0.5 reads as deeply cheap, but only if you accept that a 48% profit CAGR describes the future rather than a base effect the last three years have already contradicted. The mechanics of that trap are set out in the P/E ratio formula guide, and the same discipline applies to any low PEG built on a recovery year.

The practical response is to anchor forward assumptions on the three-year record and the trailing improvement, not on the five-year compound rate, and that is what the scenario section below does.

Margins and returns: read the basis before the number

Two different margin figures appear in the captured material and they are not measuring the same thing.

Measure	Reading at the cut-off	What it is measured on
Operating margin, Screener basis	19.61%	Screener’s operating-profit definition
EBITDA margin, computed	About 20.1%	₹253 Cr EBITDA on ₹1,258 Cr trailing revenue
Operating margin, Yahoo field	9.18%	A different and narrower operating-income basis
Net profit margin	11.84%	Trailing profit on trailing revenue
ROE	16.14%	Profit on shareholders’ equity
ROCE	18.08%	Profit before financing on capital employed
Five-year average ROCE	22.49%	The same measure averaged over five years

The Screener operating margin of 19.61% and the computed EBITDA margin near 20.1% agree closely, which suggests both are pre-depreciation measures. The Yahoo operating-margin field of 9.18% is roughly half that and is calculated after items the other two exclude. Quoting the higher figure as though it were the lower one, or the reverse, is one of the more common ways an apparel comparison goes wrong.

The return ratios point the same way as the margin trend. ROCE of 18.08% today against a five-year average of 22.49% means the recent years have been the weaker ones, and ROE of 16.14% sits below both. These are respectable returns for a manufacturer with owned brands and owned capacity, but they are lower than this business has managed before, not higher. The return on equity guide covers why a falling ROE alongside rising revenue usually points at either margin compression or a larger equity base rather than at a demand problem.

Ownership, float and leverage

Promoters hold 74.29% of the equity, with zero pledged shares. That leaves roughly 25.71% in non-promoter hands. The foreign and domestic institutional splits were not captured, so the composition of that free float is unknown from this material.

High promoter ownership with no pledge is generally read as alignment: the family that built the brands carries most of the downside. It has a second effect that matters for a company of this size. A free float of around a quarter of a ₹3,126 crore market capitalisation is a small tradeable pool, so price can move sharply on modest flows in either direction, and a position may be harder to exit than the headline market capitalisation suggests.

Leverage cannot be assessed here. Total debt, total cash and the debt-to-equity ratio were all absent from the captured material, so no statement about the balance sheet’s strength or weakness is made in this article. Anyone continuing this work should pull those lines from the filings first; the debt-to-equity ratio guide explains which version of the ratio is worth computing for a manufacturer carrying inventory.

Valuation at the 10 September 2026 cut-off

Valuation measure	10 September 2026 reading	Interpretation
Completed-session price	₹505.65	Fixed research input, not a live quote
Market capitalisation	About ₹3,126 Cr	Small enough for liquidity and float to matter
Trailing EPS	₹23.97	Yahoo Finance trailing basis
Recalculated P/E	About 21.1×	Price divided by trailing EPS
Reported P/E	21.16×	Rounding difference only
Book value per share	₹152.31	Implies price to book of 3.33×
EV/EBITDA	12.41	Below the earnings multiple, as expected
Dividend yield	0.80%	A modest payout, not an income case
52-week range	₹413.05 to ₹592	Price sits about 14.6% below the high

The five weeks between the two capture dates are worth a second table, because they show the direction of travel rather than a level.

Measure	5 August 2026	10 September 2026	Change
Market capitalisation	₹3,298 Cr	₹3,126 Cr	Lower by about 5%
P/E	23.24×	21.10×	De-rated
Price to book	3.51×	3.33×	De-rated
Distance below 52-week high	13.3%	14.6%	Slightly wider

Twenty-one times trailing earnings is not a demanding multiple for a branded consumer business, and it is a good deal less demanding than it was in early August. It is also not obviously cheap for a company whose reported profit has fallen for two consecutive years. The valuation is doing roughly what it should: paying something for the brands and the return history, and withholding something for the margin trend.

Valuation framework

The scenario model starts with TTM EPS of ₹23.97. For each year it applies EPS_TTM × (1 + growth)^(year − 2026 + 112/365) × exit P/E, then rounds the result to the nearest ₹5. The 112/365 factor represents the fraction of the first forecast year remaining from 10 September to 31 December. Dividends are excluded, and no scenario assumes a change in the share count.

Scenario	Annual EPS growth	Exit P/E	Business interpretation
Bear	5%	14×	Sales keep growing but margin stays compressed and the market pays less for the earnings
Base	10%	19×	Profit recovers toward the trailing run rate and the multiple holds near where it sits now
Bull	15%	25×	Margin repair and channel expansion restore double-digit profit growth, with a modest re-rating

The growth rates are deliberately anchored on the three-year record and the trailing improvement rather than on the five-year compound rate discussed above. Even the bull case at 15% assumes considerably less than the historical five-year profit CAGR, because that figure is a recovery artefact. On the multiple side, the bear case sits well below the current 21.1 times, the base case a little below it, and the bull case only modestly above. Assuming both perfect earnings growth and a large permanent re-rating would simply restate today’s optimism twice. These are scenarios, not probability-weighted forecasts. The general method is set out in how to value a stock.

Kewal Kiran Clothing share price target 2026 to 2030

The grid above is generated only from the disclosed trailing EPS, the three growth rates and the three exit multiples, with the partial-year convention applied to 2026. It does not model a rights issue or any other change in share count, an acquisition, a brand disposal, a change in the dividend policy, exceptional items, working-capital shocks or a shift in the channel mix. Nor does it use quarterly results: the only quarterly rows available are revenue, with no matching profit line to read a margin from. Each of those would need to be reflected before the framework is applied again after the next set of accounts.

Risks that can break the thesis

The first risk is the one the four-year table already shows: margin. If net margin keeps sliding from the 10.9% recorded in FY26, revenue growth of 15% or more will still produce falling earnings, and a low starting multiple offers less protection than it appears to.

The second is discretionary demand. Apparel is a consumer-cyclical category, and a slow festive or wedding season shows up in volumes and in end-of-season discounting at the same time, which hits both lines at once.

The third is channel structure. Four channels means four different discount, credit and returns regimes, and e-commerce marketplaces in particular can compress realisations while appearing to add volume. Inventory risk in a seasonal, fashion-led category sits with the brand owner.

The fourth is competition and brand relevance. Denim is one of the most heavily contested categories in Indian apparel, contested by international labels, domestic private labels inside large-format retailers and fast-fashion entrants. A long-established brand has to be re-earned with each cohort of buyers, and the advertising cost of doing so lands in the same operating margin that is already under pressure.

The fifth is the leverage question flagged earlier: with no debt, cash or working-capital lines available, a build-up in inventory or receivables has not been ruled out.

What would change the picture

Three questions decide the case, and none of them can be read off a ratio in the scorecard that follows.

The first is whether FY24 was a peak or a waypoint. Reported profit of ₹155 crore that year has not been matched since, while the trailing figures point at recent quarters running better than FY26 as a whole. Whether that improvement survives into an audited financial year, rather than staying inside a trailing window that is not one, is the most useful thing the next set of accounts can settle.

The second is disclosure. A split of revenue between owned outlets, wholesale and online would show whether growth is being bought with discounts, which is the question the margin trend raises but cannot answer on its own. Advertising and promotion spend as a share of revenue would attack the same question from the cost side. Neither figure is available in this material, and neither can be inferred from the ones that are.

The third is capital deployment. A large capacity addition that arrives without a matching improvement in return on capital would say the growth is being funded rather than earned, and it would show up in the return ratios a year or two before it showed up in the margin. The recurring measures — margin, the profit-to-sales gap, the return ratios, the channel mix, the balance sheet and the ownership pattern — are set out below.

Monitoring scorecard

Question	Constructive evidence	Warning sign
Is margin repairing?	Net margin moves above the FY26 11% level and holds	Another year below the previous one
Is profit tracking sales?	Profit growth converges toward revenue growth	The gap between the two widens again
Are returns recovering?	ROCE moves back toward the 22.49% five-year average	ROCE slips below the current 18.1% and keeps drifting from the 22.49% average
Is growth profitable?	Revenue growth without a step-up in discounting	Sales rise while realisations fall
Is the balance sheet sound?	Debt, cash and working capital disclosed and stable	Inventory or receivables growing faster than sales
Is ownership stable?	Promoter holding steady at about 74% with no pledge	Pledging appears or holding falls materially

What the figures do and do not settle

Kewal Kiran Clothing is a real brand house with owned manufacturing, a long operating history, a promoter group holding nearly three-quarters of the equity with nothing pledged, and returns on capital that, even after two weaker years, remain in the high teens. At roughly 21 times trailing earnings and 3.3 times book, the market is not treating it as a growth story. It is treating it as a consumer manufacturer with a question over its margin.

That question is not settled by anything in this material. The four-year record shows the margin falling; the trailing figures suggest it has started to turn. Which of the two the next reported year confirms is the whole of the case, and it is a matter of evidence rather than of interpretation. The same lens applies across branded consumer names, and comparing this record against a pure retailer such as Trent is a useful way to see how differently the channel structure behaves.

FAQ

What is Kewal Kiran Clothing’s share price target for 2026?

The 2026 figures in the grid apply only the stub of the year that remains from 10 September, using the 112/365 factor, to trailing EPS of ₹23.97 before applying each scenario’s exit multiple. Because that partial year is short, the 2026 numbers are driven far more by the multiple assumption than by the growth assumption. They describe a range of outcomes, not a promised price.

What is Kewal Kiran Clothing’s share price target for 2030?

The 2030 figures compound the same trailing EPS across four full years plus the 2026 stub, then apply each scenario’s exit P/E. A four-year compounding horizon magnifies small differences in the growth assumption, which is why the bear and bull ends of the grid separate widely by 2030. Treat it as a sensitivity exercise rather than a forecast.

What does Kewal Kiran Clothing do?

It manufactures, markets and retails branded readymade garments and finished accessories in India and internationally. The range covers jeans, shirts, trousers, t-shirts, winterwear and accessories. Distribution runs through exclusive brand outlets, large-format stores, multi-brand outlets and e-commerce platforms.

Which brands does Kewal Kiran Clothing own?

The disclosed brand names are Killer, Easies, Lawman, Junior Killer, Kraus, Integriti and Desi Belle. Killer and Lawman are the longest-established of these in the denim category. The company owns the brands rather than manufacturing under someone else’s label, which is why the brand portfolio is central to the margin question.

Who are the promoters of Kewal Kiran Clothing?

The promoter group holds 74.29% of the equity, with zero shares pledged. The company was founded in 1980 and is based in Mumbai. The individual promoter names and the institutional split of the remaining 25.71% were not captured in this pass, so those should be read from the current shareholding filing.

What is the NSE ticker for Kewal Kiran Clothing?

The NSE symbol is KKCL. On Yahoo Finance the same security appears as KKCL.NS, which is the identifier used by the live quote at the top of this page. Both refer to the equity shares listed on the National Stock Exchange.

Related research

• Page Industries share price target
• Vedant Fashions share price target
• Trent share price target
• P/E Ratio Formula: Meaning, Calculation and Valuation
• Return on Equity (ROE): Formula, Meaning and Stock Analysis
• Debt-to-Equity Ratio: Formula, Meaning and How to Use It
• How to Value a Stock

Sources and methodology

• Kewal Kiran Clothing on Screener.in
• Kewal Kiran Clothing quote and filings on NSE
• Kewal Kiran Clothing company website

Figures were captured after the completed 10 September 2026 session. Price, the 52-week range, market capitalisation, trailing EPS, book value per share, the reported P/E and price-to-book, dividend yield, the annual revenue and net profit rows for FY23 to FY26, trailing revenue and EBITDA, the employee count, shares outstanding, promoter holding and the business description all come from Yahoo Finance. The PEG, EV/EBITDA, ROE, ROCE, five-year average ROCE, operating margin, five-year sales and profit CAGRs and the pledge percentage come from Screener.in ratios captured on 5 August 2026, which is also the source of the earlier valuation column in the comparison table. No Screener financial statement tables were captured, so no quarterly analysis appears here and no debt or cash figure is stated.

Net profit margins by year, the three-year compound rates, the EBITDA margin and the implied trailing profit are simple arithmetic on those captured figures and are marked as computed where they appear. Everything beyond that point is analytical judgment: the reading of the margin trend, the treatment of the five-year CAGR as a base effect, the interpretation of the two different operating-margin bases, the choice of growth rates and exit multiples in the scenario table, and the risk and monitoring sections.

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This article is research and education, not personalised investment advice or a recommendation to transact. Gale is not a SEBI-registered investment adviser. The scenarios are illustrations, not guarantees. Verify current exchange filings, liquidity, corporate actions and suitability, and consult a registered adviser before acting.